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Viel Narren und Toren kommen drein, 
Deren Bildnis ich hier hab gemacht. 
Wär jemand, der die Schrift veracht’t, 
Oder einer, der sie nicht könnt lesen, 
Der sieht im Bilde wohl sein Wesen 
Und schaut in diesem, wer er ist, 
(Sebastian Brant 1494) 
1. Bound for Narragonia? 
In the “The ship of fools”,
1 a satirical book that was published more than 
500 years ago, Sebastian Brant, is imagining that mankind is assembled 
on a ship sailing through the sea of time bound for the imaginary land of 
Narragonia, the land of fools. Brant entertains his readers with more than 
a hundred small poems illustrating the follies of the people on board, 
poems of greed, of trouble-making, of wooing, of arrogance, of not prac-
ticing what one preaches, of squandering, of the conflicts of virtue and 
pleasure, and a hundred other follies, crimes and vices. Each little poem 
accompanied by a literal or allegorical woodcut, some of them by 
Albrecht Dürer.  
Brant paints the not so pretty picture of the human beings acting not 
out of any greater sense of purpose, but out of self-love, low motives and 
stupidity. Fools giving in to the most base instincts and motives. In satiri-
cal form Brant showed a world that was somehow falling apart, due to the 
lack of guiding principles and norms. Principles and norms that Brant 
would only find in the belief in God. The whole exercise was meant to 
show people what kind of aimless and foolish world we would have if 
people did not bow to the will of God. 
“The ship of fools” may seem quaint in a modern world, but the pic-
ture of human kind embarked upon a ship in drifting aimlessly through 
time is also invoked today. Screamed for instance by “The Doors” in their 
version of “The ship of fools”
2 : 
 
                                           
1 Brant, S. (1494). Das Narrenschiff. Nach der Erstausgabe (Basel 1494) mit den Zusätzen der 
Ausgaben von 1495 und 1499 sowie den Holzschnitten der deutschen Originalausgaben. 
Manfred Lemmer. (2004 ed.). Tübingen: Niemeyer. 
2 Lyrics from The Doors CD: Morrison Hotel. 1990. 2 
The human race was dyin' out 
None left to scream and shout 
People walking on the moon 
Smog will get you pretty soon 
 
The vices may have a modern twist and the screaming may be harsher, 
but the message is in a way the same. The lack of some overriding com-
mon purpose may destroy the ship of fools that we call the earth. Most of 
us no longer appeal for guidance from God, but we still seem to be in the 
need of something greater than ourselves to keep us into place and pro-
vide some sense of direction. 
I am not sure that we realise that. Looking at the modern part of the 
world we seem to emphasise a more and more individualistic view, while 
deemphasising and undermining what shared overriding purpose there 
may be. Today the focus is on the independent individual, on individual 
self-realisation, on promoting self-esteem and individual assertiveness.  
It is the picture of the Marlboro Man commercial,
3 of rugged individu-
alism found for instance in the speeches of Herbert Hoover
4 and early 
American westerns. Perhaps the smoking Marlborough Man may have 
become slightly outdated, but he seems to live on in strange new attempts 
to realise one self by climbing the highest mountains, skydiving, or for 
those less well off, bungee jumping, diving as deep as possible just rely-
ing on the capacity of one’s lungs, running hundreds of kilometres in 
endurance races, struggling for hours to catch the biggest fish, and taking 
part in all sorts of strange extreme sports and survival tasks. It may look 
like a mans world, but I don’t think it is. Women are catching up and 
children too. Competing for a role in some mindless game in a TV show, 
singing, dancing, or cramming into a cage filled with spiders. In many 
ways it looks as if we are again embarked on a ship of fools bound for 
Narragonia. 
Although paradoxical it would seem that in many cases the individual 
has never been more reliant on others in order to prove his self-reliance. 
Even the Marlborough Man may in the end have come to depend upon 
                                           
3 Referring of course to Philip Morris commercial for Marlboro cigarettes going back to the 
early 1950s. The rugged cowboy figure pictured in the commercial being portrayed by 
different men, at least one of whom apparently died of cancer. 
4 Herbert Hoover speech 1928; We were challenged with the choice of the American system 
"rugged individualism" or the choice of a European system of diametrically opposed 
doctrines -- doctrines of paternalism and state socialism.  3 
the combined efforts of a whole health and medical sector to battle 
against his illness. Doubtless many other rugged individuals depend on a 
whole tangled net of other people in order for them to show off as inde-
pendent self-realising individuals. The bearers, the people constructing 
equipment, the designers of outdoor clothing, the support staff, the people 
standing by to rescue the daredevils when they have miscalculated. 
What we seem to promote and sell is the imaginary picture of an inde-
pendent self-confident, self-reliant individual, striving to reach a little 
higher than all the competing individuals in a contest of follies. Strange 
as it may be in contrast to what may have been the case with the original 
Narrenschiff, these follies are not regarded as follies, instead they seem to 
show us something that is worth striving for. When looking into the mir-
ror of our flat screen TV’s we are not seeing a mocking image of our-
selves, we are seeing our own desires and ideals. The TV-screen seems to 
have become the water pool that once reflected the picture of Narcissus. 
Today the TV-screen may be reflecting a kind of mass narcissism or self-
love.  
 The follies of such individuals may look spectacular, but they may 
not count for much on our ship. The consequences of other follies may be 
worse. The self-interest of a producer or of thousands of consumers may 
lead to follies dwarfing the follies in Brant’s “Narrenschyff”. This pre-
sumably is what “The Doors” are screaming, in order to make us listen 
and change our ways. It is about the tragedy of the commons, the foolish 
destruction by self-interested individuals of resources and environment, 
and of human relations and nobler motives, of extraregarding behaviour 
and overall purpose, of social coherence.  
The nature of these individuals would seem to fit Jensen’s and 
Meckling’s Resourceful, Evaluative, Maximising Models (REMM)
 5 of 
man quite well.  
REMM men are smart, but unscrupulous maximisers, ready to use 
every loophole available to their own advantage, and trade everything in 
order to maximise their own satisfaction. It is only a question of price. 
REMM men can be bought. They are willing to give up anything they 
value, if they can just get enough of something else they value. Moral 
                                           
5 Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1994). The Nature of Man. Journal of Applied Corporate 
Finance, 7(2, Summer), 4-19. A further elaboration of this concept used in sociology is called 
RREEMM (Restricted, Ressourceful, Expecting, Evaluative, Maximising Men). It is found in 
Kunz, V. (1996). Ökonomische Handlungslehre. Stuttgart. 4 
stance and love may be exchanged for a sufficiently large amount of 
some material goods that is also valued, like perhaps a big flat screen TV 
or a Porsche. Or a child perhaps for a refrigerator? “The fact that all indi-
viduals make trade-offs (or substitute in virtually every dimension imagi-
nable) means that there is no such thing as human “needs” […] There are 
only human wants, desires, or, in the economists language, demands.” 
 Our picture of the modern fools and their follies may have the rough 
and exaggerated outlines of a caricature, but remember a caricature is 
only a caricature if reality is still recognisable in the pen strokes. 
What we want to do now is to take a closer look at the occupants of 
this modern ship of fools. This means that we first have to take a closer 
look at the kind of individualism that we find in modern societies and the 
relation between the individuals and society. 
2. The individual enters the limelight 
How did the Marlborough Man and REMM men come to be so impor-
tant? Today this question may sound strange, because of the modern 
focus on this rugged individual endowed with an unwavering self-inter-
est. It seems so self-evident that one might never think about it.  
In order to understand this self-evidence we want to show a few snap 
shots illustrating and perhaps explaining the development that brought the 
individual and individualism into focus and made it the foundation of 
modern societies. In itself this individualism must be seen as relatively 
recent and perhaps even specific to what we see as modern Western or 
westernised societies. This is also the view of Cushman “The individual, 
bounded, communally isolated self is a modern phenomenon … roughly 
paralleling the development of industrialization and the rise of the mod-
ern state.”
6  
Let us have a closer look to see how the individual emerges from his-
tory. 
Durkheim
7 believes that he can find evidence to show that in primitive 
organisations and societies the binding collective framework of religion 
and morality was defined in a very concrete way. This means that duties 
                                           
6 Cushman, P. (1990). Why the self is empty: toward a historically situated psychology. 
American Psychologist, 45(5), 599-611, p. 601. 
7 Durkheim, E. (1981). Die Elementaren Formen des Religiösen Lebens. Frankfurt am Main 5 
were very concrete and did not leave much to the deliberation and initia-
tive of the individual. 
With the evolution of more primitive societies, the duties became 
more abstract, losing their tight relation to certain given practices, thereby 
also becoming more difficult to explain. What had once been very con-
crete and explicit evolved into abstract tacit norms and practices, which 
would influence concrete behaviour in a very circumspect way, so cir-
cumspect in fact that it would become impossible to unravel. 
What might once have governed behaviour in a very strict way, 
allowing little individual latitude, became less of a strait-jacket on indi-
vidual behaviour, thereby paving the way for individualism. “And if the 
collective type or ideal becomes that of humanity in general, it is so 
abstract and general that there is plenty of room for the development of 
the individual personality. The area of personal freedom thus tends to 
grow as society becomes more advanced.”
8 This was seen by Durkheim 
as important for the development of modern individualistic societies and 
the idea of the sovereign individual. 
On the surface it may seem strange that old societies with their high 
degree of self-sufficiency were collectivistic with very little room for 
individualism to play a role, while modern societies, with the extreme 
separation division of work and the net of global connections that each 
individual is enmeshed in, seem to offer possibilities for very individual-
istic views and behaviours. 
 Reflecting a little upon this we may see that old societies were 
dependent on family, clans and guilds, or rather on goods and services 
provided by concrete persons, meaning that people were more or less 
directly dependent on each other.  
An individual in a modern society is no longer dependent on concrete 
people, the extensive exchange of goods and services that an individual 
finds necessary is provided more or less anonymously through exchange 
mechanism like the market or by depersonalised institutions paid for 
through taxes.  
The decoupling of the individual from the closely knit community of 
men must be seen as a precondition for the development of the kind of 
individualism we are talking about here. 
                                           
8 Copleston, F. (1994). A History of Philosophy vol. ix. New York: Doubleday, p.124 6 
The individual enters the central stage in the light of the enlighten-
ment, with the attempt to free oneself from the religious dogmas, and 
omnipotent rulers.  
 This is where we find the thoughts about individuals endowed with 
liberty and individual rights. For instance in Locke’s Second Treatise of 
Government: 
“Though men as a whole own the earth and all inferior creatures, 
every individual· man owns his own person; this is something that 
nobody else has any right to. The labour of his body and the work of his 
hands, we may say, are strictly his. So when he takes something from the 
state that nature has provided and left it in, he mixes his labour with it, 
thus joining to it something that is his own; and in that way he makes it 
his property.”
9 
In this imaginary state of nature the individual is only subject to what 
Locke called natural laws, contrasting these with religious commands and 
man made laws. From this state of nature individuals can voluntarily cre-
ate societies and positive laws. He stresses the voluntary part though, 
societies must be voluntary organisations. The emphasis is on the indi-
vidual, not the society or the state. 
 No wonder that Locke with his emphasis on the individual, on private 
property and voluntary association, with a minimal state protecting the 
property rights of the individual. Locke has been seen as a defender of 
unrestricted capitalistic accumulation. Perhaps this view is a result of 
much later hindsight, it would seem difficult to attribute it to Locke, as he 
would seem to have had a rather different concern. 
He could not see the beginnings of industrialisation and of a modern 
economic system characterised by an accelerating division of work, but 
perhaps the breaking up of traditional structures like the guild and corpo-
rations that brought about the conditions for the modern market.  
All this really paved the way for a much greater role for the individual 
and for the voluntary association. Just look at the famous words found in 
Adam Smith’s “The Wealth of Nations” from 1776: “It is not from the 
benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our 
dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest. We address our-
                                           
9 Locke, J. (1976). The Second Treatise of Government — An Essay Concerning the True 
Original, Extent and End of Civil Government. Oxford: Blackwell. Chapter 5, section 27. 7 
selves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them 
of our own necessities but of their advantages."
10 
 In 1776 “The Declaration of Independence” in America may be said 
to usher in the next step in the political and material development towards 
modern individualism. Now the thoughts of Locke are put into practice, 
and I believe that one may see the inspiration in these words: “We hold 
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among 
these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”
11 Of course “men” 
did not mean all men, it did not mean women, nor did it mean slaves. One 
can imagine Jefferson writing on a draft version of the declaration, 
absentmindedly looking out on a field tilled by black slaves, sipping wine 
brought by female servants, with his thoughts far away on the design for a 
new world in which all men of property were created equal.  
Next we hear the battle cry of the French revolution: “Liberté, égalité, 
fraternité, ou la mort!” Now common man takes part and women too, as 
in the storming of the Bastille.  
On August 26, 1789 The National Assembly of France approves the 
“Declaration of the Rights of Man”. 
 Among its 17 articles we find the following:  
 
1.  Men are born and remain free and equal in rights. Social distinc-
tions may be founded only upon the general good. 
2.  The aim of all political association is the preservation of the natu-
ral and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, 
property, security, and resistance to oppression. 
4.  Liberty consists in the freedom to do everything which injures no 
one else; hence the exercise of the natural rights of each man has 
no limits except those which assure to the other members of the 
society the enjoyment of the same rights. These limits can only 
be determined by law. 
6.  Law is the expression of the general will. Every citizen has a 
right to participate personally, or through his representative, in its 
foundation. It must be the same for all, whether it protects or 
punishes. All citizens, being equal in the eyes of the law, are 
equally eligible to all dignities and to all public positions and 
                                           
10 Smith, A. (1776). The Wealth of Nations (1974 ed.). Harmondsworth: Penguin. p. 119. 
11 Excerpt from “The Declaration of Indepence” adopted July 4, 1776. 8 
occupations, according to their abilities, and without distinction 
except that of their virtues and talents. 
 
Now the genie was really out of the bottle and political movements 
and economic developments are bringing about fundamental changes that 
provide the foundations for the modern Western democracies with their 
emphasis on the individual.  
In Mill’s essay “On Liberty” from 1859
12 we find some surprisingly 
fresh ideas supporting individual liberty.  
 It comprises “the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty 
of conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and 
feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practi-
cal or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological”. Secondly “the prin-
ciple requires liberty of tastes and pursuits” meaning that we are free to 
do as we please, even engage in activities that others may find “foolish, 
perverse, or wrong” as long as we do not make ourselves “a nuisance to 
other people.” Thirdly says Mill, from the liberty of the individual “fol-
lows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individu-
als; freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others.”
13  
Mill’s arguments would seem to provide support for a kind of unbri-
dled liberalism, and a whole shipload of the follies we exemplified in the 
introduction.  
Mill is interested in civil, or social liberty and in establishing the 
nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by 
society over the individual.  
The overriding principle he established may be summarised in these lines: 
“…the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collec-
tively in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is 
self-protection.” 
Still women are not included among the sovereign individuals, but the 
realisation that women are sentient beings too was dawning quite early 
upon men here and there. In 1790 Condorcet wrote that philosophers and 
legislators were “violating the principle of equal rights by debarring 
women from citizenship rights, and thereby calmly depriving half of the 
human race of the right to participate in the formation of the laws… For 
                                           
12 Mill, J. S. (1859-1865). Utilitarianism, On Liberty, and Considerations on Representative 
Government (1977 ed.). London: J. M. Dent & Sons. 
13 Ibid. p.75. 9 
this exclusion not to constitute an act of tyranny, we would have to prove 
that the natural rights of women are not exactly the same as those of men, 
or else that they are incapable of exercising them.”
14 
Much later in Mill’s writings we again find arguments in favour of 
seeing women as having the same right as men. In fact he sees the legal 
subordination of women to men as wrong in itself and as one of “chief 
hindrances to human improvement.”
15  
Still the active intervention in the shape of women’s movements in the 
US and in the UK is needed to establish women’s rights as independent 
individuals equal to men. In the Seneca Falls “The Declaration of Senti-
ments,” from 1848 women changed the wording of the “The Declaration 
of Independence” into “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all 
men and women are created equal.”
16 This idea itself was not enough. It 
took a long struggle by American and British suffragettes to realise it, and 
I suppose that one could argue that the struggle is still going on for equal 
influence in decision-making for instance. 
 This is not our concern here though. The rise of the idea of the sover-
eign individual in general was our concern. 
Next we shall see how this individualism was seen as the foundation 
for the study and understanding of society and all other social phenom-
ena.  
3. I and We – making up society 
Taking into account the follies that individuals may be up to in the mod-
ern ship of fools, and the development of the ideas of the sovereign indi-
vidual, it may be difficult to imagine any overall purpose or direction for 
the ship, and even more difficult to see how these individuals can consti-
tute a community with enough coherence to drive the ship along in a 
direction that would mean development and progress, instead of the 
fool’s paradise of Narragonia. 
                                           
14 The first part of the quote from Condorcet’s “Sur l’admission des femmes au droit de cité 
[On the Admission of Women to the Rights of Citizenship]” is found in Block, C. D. (1998). 
Truth and Probability – Ironies in the Evolution of Social Choice Theory. Washington 
University, Law Quarterly, 76(3), 975-1038, p. 1015. The second part is quoted in 
http://www.pinn.net/~sunshine/book-sum/condorcet4.html 
15 Mill, J. S. (1869). The Subjection of Women. Here quoted from: 
http://www.constitution.org/jsm/women.htm 
16 The Declaration of Sentiments. Seneca Falls, New York, 19-20 July, 1848. The text of the 
declaration can be found at http://ecssba.rutgers.edu/docs/seneca.html 10 
A look at some of the ideas and approaches found in methodological 
individualism may perhaps help us to how this may in fact be possible. 
According to Watkins this principle states that social processes and 
events should be explained by being deduced from “(a) principles gov-
erning the behaviour of participating individuals and (b) descriptions of 
their situations."
17  
Apparently the term “Methodische Individualismus” (methodological 
individualism) was first used by the economist Carl Menger and taken up 
by Schumpeter in his attempt to explain “Das Wesen und der Hauptinhalt 
der theoretischen Nationalökonomie.” Schumpeter argued that although 
the individual cannot live in isolation and is subject to multitude of influ-
ences from his social environment, we cannot study these influences. 
Methodologically we must limit ourselves to the study of individual 
behaviour. In the sense "daß man bei der Beschreibung gewisser 
wirtschaftlicher Vorgänge von dem Handeln der Individuen ausgehe.”
18 
Thus Schumpeter is essentially arguing from a standpoint of methodo-
logical necessity. 
In “Economy and Society” Weber
19 had argued that social phenomena 
must be seen as a result of the actions of individuals and in order to 
understand and explain social institutions one must look at the intentions, 
motives, decisions and actions of the individual actors. In Weber’s ver-
sion we are not just talking about a methodological necessity. The indi-
vidual has taken on an ontological importance. 
 More extreme versions of methodological individualism have gone 
even further, arguing for a kind of individual atomism implying a view of 
society as consisting only of collections of individuals free to act as they 
please. While this may fit our simple version of modern ship of fools, 
more sophisticated versions of methodological individualism did not 
deny the influence and importance of social institutions like the state, 
community, religion etc. “Methodological individualism, far from con-
testing the significance of such collective wholes, considers it as one of 
                                           
17 Watkins, J. W. N. (1973). Ideal Types and Historical Explanation. In J. O'Neill (Ed.), Modes 
of Individualism and Collectivism (pp. 143-165). London: Heinemann, p. 149. See also 
Popper, K. R. (1945). Die Autonomie der Soziologie. In K. R. Popper & D. Miller (Eds.), 
Lesebuch: ausgewählte Texte zu Erkenntnistheorie, Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften, 
Metaphysik, Sozialphilosophie (pp. 337-349). Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. 
18 Schumpeter, J. A. (1908). Das Wesen und der Hauptinhalt der theoretischen 
Nationalökonomie. München, p. 90. Quoted from http://www.rote-ruhr-
uni.com/texte/ganssmann_individualismus.shtml 
19 Weber, M. (1956). Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (1956 ed.). Tübingen: Mohr 11 
its main tasks to describe and to analyze their becoming and their disap-
pearing, their changing structures, and their operation.”
20  
 Still von Mises asserts that all actions are performed by individuals. 
“The Ego is the unity of the acting being. It is unquestionably given and 
cannot be dissolved or conjured away by any reasoning or quibbling. The 
We is always the result of a summing up which puts together two or more 
Egos.”
21  
In a bizarre example he argues that it is the hangman, not the state that 
executes an individual. The social collective has no existence outside the 
individual members and their actions. Social institutions come into being 
through the actions of individuals. 
In a certain sense von Mises is of course right, social institutions are 
erected by individuals and consist of individuals, but can we understand 
these institutions just by studying the individuals making up these insti-
tutions?  
Could we get the idea of a cathedral by studying the individual stones 
that make up the cathedral? Isn’t a cathedral more than a heap of stones? 
Mises argues that from the stone mason’s viewpoint we look at the indi-
vidual stones, from an architect’s view we may see the whole project. 
“For the architect the whole project is the main thing.”  
If this is the case then it would seem that von Mises undermines his 
own main argument. The architect may have no idea of what the individ-
ual stone mason is doing, and may not be interested in the single stones, 
as long as the overall structure evolves. A single stone mason on the other 
hand has to follow a stringent plan, stones cannot be placed according to 
individual whim. In a sense we cannot understand much about the cathe-
dral just by looking at the individual stone masons intentions and actions. 
We need to have the view of the architect, and the cathedral is indeed 
something more than a collection of stones. Even the view of the architect 
isn’t enough. In order to see the object as a cathedral we need to know the 
intangible views of religion, and a lot of other more intangible wholes. 
To a social scientist a group, a community, a nation state or company 
might represent their cathedral, and thus their object would in a sense be 
                                           
20 Mises, L. v. (1949). Human Action (1996 ed.). San Francisco: Fox and Wilkes [Original 
version Ludwig Von Mises (1940) Nationalökonomie : Theorie Des Handelns und 
Wirthschaftens. Geneva: Editions Union Gent. Here quoted from chapter 2 of the online 
version of the Ludwig von Mises Institute: http://www.mises.org/humanaction.asp 
21 Ibid. 12 
the whole cathedral or entity, not the single “stone masons” or individuals 
that had built these institutions.  
Von Mises would seem to agree. What else are we to make of the fol-
lowing comment about man and his destiny: “His will is not "free" in the 
metaphysical sense of this term. It is determined by his background and 
all the influences to which he himself and his ancestors were exposed. 
Inheritance and environment direct a man's actions. They suggest to him 
both the ends and the means. He lives not simply as man in abstracto.”
22 
Perhaps we conclude that strict individualism would represent a view 
in which individuals would be reduced to something like the molecules of 
a gas, and their actions to the Brownian motions of this gas. While this 
may constitute a gas in physics it does not amount to anything approach-
ing a social phenomenon. Ayn Rand’s and Rothbard’s ultralibertarian 
ideas
23 may be getting close to this view.  
 Hayek, who is a proponent of a milder version of methodological 
individualism would criticize such ideas as a false individualism that 
“postulates the existence of isolated or self-contained individuals.” A true 
individualism has to be based upon the idea of “men whose whole nature 
and character is determined by their existence in society.”
24 
Thus Hayek recognises wholes in the shape of cathedral, societies, 
economies and perhaps regions, as something existing irrespective of the 
single stones or individuals making up this whole. 
 It is important here to emphasise that Hayek discerns between social 
phenomena and physical things. Thus a cathedral might be described 
using the concepts and laws of physics, in fact using theories and models 
of science.  
The social entity cathedral is something completely different and can-
not be understood using views and methods imported from natural sci-
ence. In Hayek’s view this would represent misguided scientism. “Social 
structures are never given to us as natural units” and they are certainly 
“not definite objects given to observe.”
25  
                                           
22 Ibid. 
23 See for instance Rand, A. (1964). The Virtue of Selfishness. New York: New American 
Library. Rothbard, M. N. (1978). For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto. New York: 
Collier Books 
24 Hayek, F. A. (1948). Individualism and Economic Order. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, p. 6. 
25 Hayek, F. A. v. (1942) The Facts of the Social Sciences. Quoted here from Zwirn, G. (2003). 
Methodological Individualism or Methodological Atomism:The Case of Friedrich August von 13 
Spontaneous order … 
How can methodological individualism be reconciled with the view that 
there are social wholes or regularities that cannot be reduced to individual 
intentions and actions? Cryptically Hayek states: “Phenomena like lan-
guage or the market, money or morals, are not real artefacts, products of 
deliberate creation. Not only have they not been designed by any mind, 
but they are also preserved by, and depend for their functioning on the 
actions of people who are not guided by the desire to keep them in exis-
tence.”
26  
 The important point here is that these wholes are not a result of delib-
erate concerted actions by the individuals, guided by rational intentions 
and grand plans. It is instead a spontaneous order generated as a result of 
the individual actions. Actions guided by the limited views of individuals. 
The results in the shape of the social phenomena we are talking about 
emerge so to speak behind their backs. Furthermore the “significance of 
the abstract character of such orders rests on the fact that they may persist 
while all the particular elements they comprise, and even the number of 
such elements, change.”
27  
Think of an anthill if you will. The individual ants may have a very 
limited view and very limited tasks. They “know” nothing of the structure 
that they erect, and the society they are creating by their individual 
actions. Even so it is through their actions that a structure emerges that 
looks to have a very material existence and a very clear purpose.  
So how do we get purposeful structure or spontaneous order as a result 
of a myriad of individuals acting in their own interest, with their own 
intentions and plans? Elsewhere
28 we have tried to explain how this may 
happen using a simple thought experiment with two robotic ants in the 
attempt to understand how cooperation may emerge as a result of mind-
less individual activity. 
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 A couple of robots, looking remarkably like ants, are milling around 
on a level playing field surrounded by an immovable barrier. A round 
cylinder is placed on its side somewhere on this playing field. The robot 
ants are programmed to move forward, unless they meet an immovable 
barrier, in which case they wait for a while and then back off to continue 
their aimless activity in a random direction. Two robots hitting the rolling 
surface of the cylinder at right angles within the same short time interval 
and from the same direction will be able to move the cylinder. Often one 
hits the cylinder, often both at the same time but from different directions, 
and the cylinder does not budge. Now waiting for some time we may see 
that by chance two robots happen to hit the cylinder from the same direc-
tion at right angles, and it moves. Because it moves, the robots continue 
to push.  
What we have is a kind of statistical cooperation coupled with a sim-
ple programmed response. Perhaps this is the cooperation we find with 
real ants too. And perhaps this is also a characteristic of some of our 
human efforts, for instance in situations where we have no idea of how to 
solve a problem that we do not really understand and solve on our own.  
In some cases it would seem that spontaneous coordination is possible 
to achieve even with large numbers of individuals involved. Some of you 
will have seen football games and maybe even have taken part in one of 
those giant human waves sweeping around a stadium, made up of spec-
tators alternately rising from their seats and sitting down. How are they 
synchronised? Like a flight of birds?  
 Except for the thought experiment with the robotic ants we expect 
that individual efforts are guided by an intention to achieve something. 
Trying to do this we might discover that cooperation with others makes it 
easier to achieve this something. Move heavy objects or whatever. 
These combined efforts may become habits that sooner or later 
become crystallized as social institutions as cathedral building, markets, 
money, companies, a system of ethics, laws, and states.  
While I believe this might help explain the origins of spontaneous 
order and the social institutions that Hayek is talking about, it does not 
really help us understand how these institutions are preserved.  
We have seen Hayek asserting that the institutions are “preserved by, 
and depend for their functioning on the actions of people who are not 
guided by the desire to keep them in existence.” This sounds somewhat 
mysteriously. How can that be? 15 
The simple explanation might be that Hayek sees these institutions 
somewhat along the lines of market mechanism. A single individual may 
have no desire to keep the market system in existence, acting like Smith’s 
baker only out of self-love. The invisible hand of the market coordinates 
and regulates the self-loving efforts of the baker in a way that benefits all 
and helps preserve the functioning of the market system. 
An individual “generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the pub-
lick interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. …by directing [his] 
industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he 
intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by 
an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. 
Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pur-
suing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more 
effectually than when he really intends to promote it.”
29 
It is doubtful whether the somewhat rosy picture of individualism and 
spontaneous social order that is painted here can stand the test of reality. 
Let us see why.  
 The market does not preserve itself in the simple manner just 
described. In order to preserve market and the invisible hand mechanism 
it is necessary that every individual abides by a myriad of practices, 
norms, and rules, or we would soon have no market. In order to complete 
just a single transaction on the market it is necessary that those taking 
part in the transaction can have trust in the transaction, either by having 
trust in each other, or by having a social institution outside that market 
that guarantees that I can have trust in the transaction.  
Such a system would in former times have been the rules governing 
the activities of the members of a guild aimed at preventing deception and 
cheating. “The butchers were forbidden to inflate the meat, to mix tallow 
with lard, to sell dog’s flesh, and so on.”
30 In 1623 the statute of the 
butcher’s guild in Copenhagen “forbids all butchers strictly and seriously 
to sell any kind of fresh meat from animals having died from disease, on 
punishment of loss of honour and right to be a butcher.”
31 
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Today the deceptions and tricks disclosed in recent food scandals may 
be somewhat more sophisticated, but one gets the idea. Just take a look at 
the EU regulation governing ecological production of agricultural prod-
ucts. The annex concerning plants and plant products requires one to fol-
low a whole catalogue of strict rules. Here are some: 
-  “at least 95 % of the ingredients of agricultural origin of the 
product are, or are derived from, products obtained in accordance 
with the rules laid down in Article 6 or imported from third coun-
tries under the arrangements laid down in Article 11; 
-  all the other ingredients of agricultural origin of the product are 
included in Annex VI, Section C or have been provisionally 
authorized by a Member State in accordance with any 
implementing measures adopted where appropriate pursuant to 
paragraph 7; 
-  the product or its ingredients have not been subjected to treat-
ments involving the use of ionizing radiation; 
-  the product has been produced without the use of genetically 
modified organisms and/or any products derived from such 
organisms.”
32  
Of course there is much more to it. This is not important here though, 
what is important is the reason for this regulation.  
 An individual farmer motivated only by self-love might want to sell 
products produced in a manner that has nothing to do with ecological 
principles under an ecological label because ecological products reach a 
higher price in the market. For a consumer it would be impossible to dif-
ferentiate between this farmer’s products and products following stringent 
ecological principles. Motivated by self-love others might follow the 
example set by the farmer and the result would be that real ecological 
products would be forced out of the market.  
Indeed this might be an illustration of Gresham’s law stating that bad 
quality will drive out good quality, or of Akerlof’s theory explaining the 
manner in which lemon’s drives out the cherries in the market. “There 
may be potential buyers of good quality products and there may be 
potential sellers of such products in the appropriate price range; however, 
                                           
32 COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) No 2092/91 of 24 June 1991 on organic production of 
agricultural products and indications referring thereto on agricultural products and foodstuffs. 
CONSLEG: 1991R2092 — 01/05/2004, p. 8. 17 
the presence of people who wish to pawn bad wares as good wares tends 
to drive out legitimate business.”
33 
Now this would seem to indicate that the market does not preserve 
itself, that in fact individuals motivated only by self-love would soon 
undermine the market.  
There are many other problems with the idea of individuals motivated 
only by self love or in modern parlance self-interest. There are the well 
known and classical problems related to the provision of public goods, 
free riding or the Malibu surfer’s dilemma. Or the problems relating to 
variations of the prisoner’s dilemma.  
 Thus it should be evident that anything approaching a theory of 
strong individualism is untenable in practice. The individual cannot be 
free to do whatever he pleases, and self love must be tempered by some-
thing outside the individual. We have to see collectives in the shape of 
social institutions as very real, reified entities, that must influence the 
activities of each and every individual, somewhat in the way an existing 
anthill society influences the individual ant. In a similar way man shapes 
social institutions and is in turn shaped by these, albeit in a way that is 
immeasurably more complicated and complex than the anthill. 
Upholding order 
It is now evident that the social order which may have been achieved 
spontaneously must be upheld by something outside the single individual, 
somewhat greater than this individual, something of a collective nature. 
This something must include some kind of shared values and some kind 
of contract that defines an apparatus, like a state that guarantees the order 
achieved through laws, and through the use of a power apparatus legiti-
mized by the contract and the laws. 
 The question we are interested in is the differences between the 
implicit order upheld by shared values on the one hand and the explicit 
order upheld by a state apparatus on the other hand. Another question we 
are interested in is the question of the balance and relation between 
shared values and a state apparatus. 
To see what this means let us return to the example with ecological 
farm products and look at the explicit order upheld by a public institution, 
in this case the EU and the nation states. The self-interest of the individ-
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ual farmer is held at bay by a very elaborate set of rules and regulations, 
including a system of controls and presumably sanctions. In this way it is 
hoped the farmer is forced to comply with the rules governing the pro-
duction of ecological products, and is prevented from cheating by selling 
non-ecological products under an ecological label. He is in other words 
forced to behave in a certain way. This system of regulation from outside 
does nothing to alter his self-interest, it just limits his possibility of exer-
cising it. He may still act out of self interest, like a REMM man looking 
for every kind of loophole in the regulation or areas in which regulation is 
not accompanied by control and sanctions, as we described elsewhere.
34  
 What would happen in the hypothetical situation where the farmer 
somehow had been imbued with the value that it would be wrong to cheat 
and sell non-ecological products under the label of ecology? In this case 
his self-interest would be tempered by the consciousness and the convic-
tion that it would be wrong to cheat, even if it would result in a greater 
profit. No regulation would be necessary to force him to comply with 
standards defining ecological products. 
 In a more realistic situation perhaps in which we realize the need for 
some kind of regulation to guard against cheaters, shared values temper-
ing self-interested behaviour have an important role. In most cases it 
would be impossible to make rules that catch all attempts to cheat and 
likewise a 100 % per cent control would be too costly to be achievable. 
Thus we still have to rely on some sort of shared value that would make 
individuals abide not only by the words of a rule, but by the purpose of 
the rule. Even this simple example would seem to indicate the importance 
of the social phenomena of shared values, a kind of social grammar 
binding us to expressions limited by this grammar, similar to the way in 
which a shared language grammar is incorporated in our verbal expres-
sions, at least if we wish to make ourselves understood by others.
35  
 How would such shared values emerge in a society of self-interested 
individuals? 
Hume had the idea that the utility of for instance cooperation would be 
felt directly, instead of being a result of deliberations and conscious 
reflection. “Two men who pull the oars of a boat do it by agreement or 
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convention, though they have never given promises to each other.”
36 
They can feel, for want of a better word, the advantages of cooperation 
directly. This again leads us back to the idea of the two robot ants hap-
pening to push in the same direction at the same time.  
No compact was expressed for general discussion and mutual consent. 
This to Hume would have been far beyond the mental abilities of the 
individual members of early societies. Instead a tacit cooperation on con-
crete problems, like oar-pulling, showed itself to be advantageous, and 
this made it become more frequent, until its frequency gradually pro-
duced a habitual, voluntary and therefore precarious acquiescence in the 
people. In the oar-pulling process the cooperation may become better and 
better every time one has to row together with others. In other forms of 
cooperation stable patterns more important to morality may have 
emerged, in reciprocal exchange of favours, in trade arrangements and so 
on. Slowly this may have led to changes in expectations with regard to 
other individuals, and in emerging dependence on each other. 
In other words, certain forms of behaviour may have coagulated in 
conventions, habits or norms, that by and by may have lost their close ties 
to the problems that brought them about, just leaving impressions in the 
tacit strands of an invisible moral fabric. 
In the example with the farmer we were looking for social institutions 
that would contain and limit the expressions of individual self-interest in 
a way that would benefit all individuals. 
Now what about the opposite problem, identifying what might con-
tribute positively to a social order that assures and enhances individual 
freedom and rights?  
We find expressions of Human individual rights in for instance “The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”
37 A few of the articles seem 
inspired by ideas of Locke and Mill. For instance article 1 “All human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed 
with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit 
of brotherhood.” Or article 3 “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and 
security of person.” 
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Now, who and what assures that individuals are free and equal in dig-
nity and rights? The immediate answer is the answer that Locke and Mill 
gave: The law and the state do.  
“The Universal Declaration of Human Rights” goes much further in 
its demands than Locke and Mill. Article 25 for instance points to the 
state as the social institution responsible for assuring the individual “the 
right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of 
himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical 
care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of 
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of 
livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.” 
This would certainly fit the view of a modern welfare state, taking 
over more and more responsibility for the individual, from in vitro fertili-
sation to the urn containing the ashes of the individual. With advanced 
and specialised health and social care systems, with institutions for safe-
keeping, for aimless and mindless activity, and for education, with insti-
tution upon institution, with safeguard upon safeguard, the states respon-
sibility for our lives would seem to have gone so far that we may have 
only the areas of consumption and leisure left to ourselves. Even here 
public institutions encroach upon us, as we are treated to cultural contri-
butions, music and theatre schemes.  
 While the social order created in a welfare state assures and enhances 
individual life and security, it may in fact reduce liberty and the responsi-
bility of the individual, although this individual is supposed to be 
“endowed with reason and conscience.”  
Thus I wonder if we are leaving conscience and reason, and responsi-
bility for our own lives more and more to the social institutions of the 
modern welfare state. This institutionalised responsibility is certain to 
erode the tacit values that can only be upheld by individuals acting upon 
them in their everyday life.  
If we lose these shared and tacit values that amongst others demand 
individual responsibility we might get a kind of irresponsible self-centred 
individualism.  
If that were to be the case our individualism would in essence be 
reduced to the freedom of a spoiled and foolish child given to all sorts of 
narcissistic and hedonistic impulses and plays, like the follies found in 
the introduction, but having no real responsibility of its own.  21 
This picture of the individual found here would be a travesty of the 
individual that Locke and Mill sought to pave the way for.  
Although rights may help create freedom, there is a danger that this 
freedom will be a freedom of indifference; the freedom not to get 
involved, the freedom not to take on responsibilities. “The concept of 
human obligations … serves to balance the notions of freedom and 
responsibility: while rights relate more to freedom, obligations are asso-
ciated with responsibility. Despite this distinction, freedom and responsi-
bility are interdependent. Responsibility, as a moral quality, serves as a 
natural, voluntary check for freedom. In any society, freedom can never 
be exercised without limits. Thus, the more freedom we enjoy, the greater 
the responsibility we bear, toward others as well as toward ourselves. The 
more talents we possess, the bigger the responsibility we have to develop 
them to their fullest capacity. We must move away from the freedom of 
indifference towards the freedom of involvement.”
38  
In the UK they seem to have realised that it is important to shift the 
balance between public and individual responsibility towards the individ-
ual: 
“The vast majority of the British public believe that it is the State’s 
responsibility to provide healthcare for the sick, but less than a third think 
that it is the State’s responsibility to provide a job for everyone who 
wants one ... A sharpening of the sense of personal responsibility may 
help to explain the shift in some public attitudes away from a reliance on 
government in a number of key policy areas in the late 1980s /early 
1990s. The welfare reforms in the late 1990s based on ‘tough love’ 
appear to reflect these shifting public attitudes – that there should not be 
‘rights without responsibilities’, and that the receipt of publicly-funded 
benefits should be linked to an obligation to take available work or train-
ing.”
39  
From this long and tedious discussion we may have got a glimpse of 
the relation between individual and society in the modern world. We have 
seen how the idea of the sovereign individual emerged in a battle against 
all sorts of totalitarian and collectivistic influences. Hayek helped us 
understand how individual efforts not guided by any overall idea or mas-
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ter plan might have brought about a spontaneously social order consisting 
of social institutions from markets to states to ethical value systems. 
But this did not really show how social institutions could be pre-
served, for this we need to understand how these social institutions in turn 
influenced the individuals making up society, through the laws and the 
state apparatus and through the shared values that had emerged.  
 From this we may be able to see that upholding a society depends on 
a very fragile balance of values and institutions on the one hand, and 
individual actions and self-love on the other hand. 
 We surmised that this fragile balance may be shifting in a direction in 
which the state is taking over more and more responsibility from the indi-
vidual, while at the same time the individual may have lost the immediate 
sense for the importance of the values and attitudes that are necessary for 
upholding this precarious balance. Once we were able to see the immedi-
ate benefits of for instance cooperation as in the examples provided. Now 
we may no longer realise the importance of a cooperation that has to 
include a large part of the world. Now we may only be able to see our 
own self-interest, and that may be a major problem as we shall see in the 
next section. 
4. “Because I am worth it”  
Or “Parce que je le vaux bien,” as it sounds in the original version of the 
L’Oréal commercial
40 showing the intensive antiwrinkle and firming 
qualities of the Revitalift formula for Women from the age of 40. Perhaps 
this wonderful expression can stand for the modern focus on the individ-
ual and a version of self-love that would be quite close to narcissism.  
Not in the strict sense perhaps of the personality disorder described in 
say the Diagnostic and Statistics Manual (DSM), or in Freud’s writings 
on primary narcissism, but in more general terms as something that might 
help us categorise an individual in modern society, more like the myth 
found in Ovid’s metamorphosis, in which Narcissus is a beautiful young 
man, who spurned the love of others. One day he discovers his own 
reflection in a pond and falls in love with this reflection. 
The self-love of the reflection in the pond of a modern Narcissus 
would include a grandiose conception of self, guiding fantasies of suc-
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cess, of power, of beauty and general admiration. Filled with such 
expectations he wants to have them fulfilled. Narcissus needs to be 
admired, needs to feel important and entitled to admiration and praise 
without really having done anything to earn it. He is yearning for a role in 
the spotlight and is craving for constant attention. 
Occupied with the attempt to live up to his own fantasies and expecta-
tions Narcissus shows shallowness in emotional relationships. Like the 
mythical Narcissus he ignores or does not respond to the love of others. 
Lacking empathy he may be incapable of having sympathy for others. 
Instead he strives to present the right impression on the surface, using this 
to manipulate and exploit others to his own advantage. Overwhelmed by 
fantasies of grandeur he may not take kindly to criticism, humiliation and 
positions of inferiority. 
It is obvious that in most cases the expectations cannot not fulfilled. 
They are set too high and there are too many having the same high 
expectations. This creates a kind of entitlement gap, presumably filled 
with frustration and creating a potential to use short cuts and devious 
means in order to close the gap. 
In a strange book entitled “Malignant Self-love,”
41 perhaps in itself a 
product of the author’s own narcissism, Vaknin talks about narcissism in 
the boardroom, describing how managers use whatever it takes to close 
the gap, which he calls the grandiosity gap. 
Such managers only care about appearances and seem to have almost 
psychopathic traits. They lack a sense of empathy and they do not seem to 
be able to put themselves into the minds of other people. In Vaknin’s 
view a narcissist manager does not recognise conventional boundaries in 
the striving for grandeur. “Everything and everyone are to him mere 
instruments, extensions, objects unconditionally and uncomplainingly 
available in his pursuit of narcissistic gratification. This makes the narcis-
sist perniciously exploitative. He uses, abuses, devalues, and discards 
even his nearest and dearest in the most chilling manner. The narcissist is 
utility- driven, obsessed with his overwhelming need to reduce his anxi-
ety and regulate his labile sense of self-worth by securing a constant sup-
ply of his drug - attention.”
42  
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A good illustration of this malignant self-love is perhaps found in the 
book
43 and the movie “American Psycho”, where we find a narcissistic 
individual using, abusing and devaluing everything. It is the story of the 
Wall Street broker Patrick Bateman obsessed with outer perfection and 
seeking constant stimulation. But it is also a story about self-love turning 
psychotic and murderous.  
Less malignant narcissistic individualism is promoted and encouraged 
everywhere today, in the media, in the focus on celebrity, in learning, in 
psychology, in advertising, in the culture of the body, in consumption. 
In “The Culture of Narcissism”
44 Lasch saw modern society as a soci-
ety promoting this kind of narcissism, in the self awareness movement 
and the emphasis on individualism and self-gratification at the expense of 
the community. “[T]he perception that success depends on psychological 
manipulation and that all of life, even the ostensibly achievement-ori-
ented realm of work, centers on the struggle for interpersonal advantage, 
the deadly game of intimidating friends and seducing people.”
45  
Others have had similar ideas, thus Sennett talks of “The Fall of Pub-
lic Man”
46 criticising the way self-absorption in modern societies drives 
out the interest in this society. In Sennett’s description Western societies 
are moving away from an other-directed condition to an inner-directed 
condition. Private expectations and psychological categories are intruding 
into and eroding the public realm.  
I am not sure that Sennett is right. It may seem like this is what is hap-
pening, but the inner-directedness may just be a surface phenomenon. In 
essence the individual inner-directedness may be the reflection of some-
thing outside the individual. We may have lost important parts of the 
other-directedness attributable to religion, ideology, shared values in gen-
eral, and other social institutions. But this other-directedness may have 
been substituted by new forms for other-directedness in the shape of 
fashions, fads, interest in exotic religion, gurus, and other more ephem-
eral phenomena catering to the narcissist.  
Take a look at modern media culture. Not the least television with 
series and movies showing fantasies of success, of power and of faultless 
beauty. Similar fantasies can be enacted in the self-orchestrated adventure 
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games, in which everyone can take on their favourite role in a virtual 
world. 
 Mass media has also helped bring about a celebrity culture that 
epitomises narcissism. Larger than life figures are receiving the focused 
attention and admiration of millions of fans, fuelling the dreams and fan-
tasies of their viewers. These figures show what it really means to 
become the centre of attraction. 
No wonder that it has become popular for individuals to compete in 
strange TV contests, where they may conquer the limelight for a few sec-
onds or minutes, and even have the chance to change over night into a 
celebrity of their own. 
The public interest in the psychology of strange new personal disor-
ders like the hyperactivity of individuals categorised as ADHD or 
DAMP,
47 may perhaps reflect and encourage a growing focus on individ-
ual peculiarities, ignoring perhaps the social conditions that further the 
growth of personal disorders. A strange thought perhaps, but one may 
wonder whether even a problematic diagnosis of ADHD does not in fact 
encourage some of the narcissistic traits, by making individuals suffering 
from ADHD special and thus the focus of attention.  
Perhaps even trends in education may reflect and encourage individu-
alism and certain narcissistic traits. In education the focus seems to be 
shifting more and more to the individual and its potential. The task is to 
unfold the potential of the single individual. Thus PISA tests
48 measure 
only what individuals working on their own can achieve. Recently the 
Danish Minister of Education decreed that group-exams were abolished. 
From now on pupils and students had to be graded individually. 
 This may all be a bit airy, other trends are more tangible, like the 
interest in one’s body. They are catered for in commercials that often em-
phasise exactly the aspect that L’Oréal expresses, convincing me that “I 
am worth it,” and showing a glimmering reflection of how we will look 
when buying this product. How we will be admired, earn praise, stealing 
away the spotlight from all the others. It is not only a question of using 
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anti-wrinkle formulas, it is the whole universe of individual centred 
commercials reflecting our alter egos in the flat screen pond. Selling us 
success and admiration through cosmetics, hair shampoo, teeth whitening 
and what not. 
Somewhat more intrusive is beauty enhancing body modelling, com-
monly called cosmetic surgery. According to statistics released by the 
American Society for Aesthetic Plastic Surgery (ASPS),
49 more than 10.2 
million cosmetic surgical and nonsurgical procedures were performed in 
the United States in 2005. Among these were procedures like: Liposuc-
tion, Breast augmentation, Mentoplasty, Laser hair removal, Eyelid sur-
gery, Hyaluronic acid (Hylaform, Restylane), Rhinoplasty, 
Microdermabrasion, Abdominoplasty.
50 The next step must surely be to 
remodel muscle mass, creating a totally remodelled athletic body. 
Together with more advanced anti-wrinkle methods using Botox we will 
soon be able to recognise in ourselves a genuine narcissus, when looking 
into the reflecting pond or in the admiring faces of our fellow men and 
women. If we can still recognise ourselves that is. 
Anti-aging is still in its infancy, but until it has grown up, there is a 
convincing attempt to transform the boomer generation into a generation 
of zoomers. “These new boomers are coloring outside the lines, zig-zag-
ing and zooming toward a bright new horizon chock-full of possibilities 
for reinventing retirement and redefining what it means to be a mature 
adult in the new millennium.”
51  
A zoomer is someone who:  
 
▪   understands the difference between primary (inevitable) and 
secondary (reversible) aging 
▪   exercises daily (aerobics for endurance, anaerobics for strength, 
and neurobics for brain power) 
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▪   can calculate daily nutritional and caloric needs based on age, 
gender, and weight 
▪   enjoys a social support system of companions, close friends, and 
a confidante 
▪   maintains a positive self-concept, and a passion for living life to 
the fullest 
▪   has the resources to live an adventurous life thanks to sound 
retirement planning. 
 
A zoomer is an aging narcissist keeping up appearances, feverishly 
demonstrating agility and youthfulness not the least by conspicuous con-
sumption. 
Do we also detect a hedonistic streak in here that includes not only the 
zoomers but the whole of society. The narcissistic individual may seem to 
be in permanent fear of losing not only his good looks, his good fortune 
and his youthfulness, he also seems to live in permanent fear of some-
thing causing him to become unhappy, or subject to pain. Our hedonistic 
streak shows in our constant attempts to seek pleasure, instant pleasure 
and instant happiness. We demand that social institutions even out the 
bumps on the path of our lives, in order to avoid pain and unhappiness, 
we consume drugs like Prozac or Frontec not just to ease depressions but 
to feel self-assured and even happy. I wonder if we rely more and more 
on a chemically induced rush in the shape of a drug to make us feel in 
charge, or even ecstatic. 
 I am what I consume 
Conspicuous consumption, a term coined by Veblen,
52 was once used to 
describe the consumption habits of the wealthy leisure class. It was con-
sumption calculated to show off social status and wealth. Now a new kind 
of conspicuous consumption seems to define the narcissistic individual: 
“I am what I consume.”  
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Advertising seems to focus on exactly this by demonstrating the gran-
diose status an individual may achieve in the consumption of this or that 
product. 
A review of the new Mercedes top of the line S-Class in the magazine 
TopGear ends with this: “It’s big and commanding, and there’s real 
power in those rear haunches. It just isn’t that easy to love. But then the 
S-Class doesn’t exist to be loved. It’s here for respect. And it looks like 
it’ll get it. Fortunately, that’s down to the car, not to the fact that some of 
its future owners are plain scary.”
53 So however you are, whatever you 
do, you will get respect by driving around in the S-Class. The Germans 
have a word for it “Überholprestige” or overtaking prestige.  
Just flipping through a magazine one may see how dresses, watches, 
cars, vacations, yachts, and myriad of other things bought and consumed 
individually, show how easy one might become the centre of attraction.  
“Every night , on television advertisements, you see smooth-jawed 
men in £ 30,000 cars, attracting the envious, admiring glances of their 
peers and attractive women … Values however, percolate through our 
culture (or lack of it). Witty, moneyed advertisers have always sought to 
sell us more and more expressive possessions, but they now also choose 
to do so by relentlessly mocking any “value” which is not material; usu-
ally those found in either marriage or religion.”
54  
A little less is the celebrity status achievable by the consumption of 
less costly and more ubiquitous products like hair shampoo and the right 
detergent. 
Holbrook and Hirschman
55 argue that buying, using, showing off, and 
discarding products is a form of self-articulation. It may even look as if 
this form of self-articulation is becoming a main aim of one’s life.  
In “The Social Psychology of Material Possessions”
56 Dittmar reaches 
a similar conclusion. Consumption and positional goods function as 
material symbols of identity. “The ways in which people relate to their 
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possessions can be seen as reflections of how they view themselves and 
relate to their social and physical environment.”
57  
The idea of seeking to achieve positional goods is found already in 
Hirsch’s “Social Limits to growth”
58 in the 1970’s. Positional goods are 
goods that achieve their value from their scarcity and exclusiveness.  
The key term “life-style” is signifying that one can choose to be what-
ever one chooses, essentially using consumption to show off one’s life 
style. This showing off today includes more than dressing up in a certain 
way, buying and consuming certain stuff, it includes the social connec-
tions you have, where you are seen and in the company of whom. It is as 
if one may be setting up a theatre play with one self as the main character, 
decorating the scene with the right props and a supporting cast of people 
in one’s network and passing glimpses of celebrities one may know.  
Life style signifies a kind of superficiality of the individual. I am 
nothing more than the play I am enacting today. There is no original me. 
 5. Individuals floating in the air  
Modern day narcissistic individuals seem to be engaged in cutting loose 
from community. If this happens the individual is leaving the ground, to 
float freely in the thin air, alone in a loose collection of other individuals 
that have also left the ground they were embedded in.  
These free floating individuals are not alone, they are together with 
others in the same predicament, they are alone in a mass of others in the 
same situation. One may feel tempted to use the title of Riesman’s book 
term “The Lonely Crowd”
59. 
 Picture if you will a multilane freeway in the US during morning rush 
hour. An avalanche moving slowly and sometimes not at all towards the 
city consisting of thousands of cars with a single driver. They are in the 
same predicament as they are all in a crowd, but at the same time they are 
all alone. They only see each other as vague shapes of anonymous heads 
and hands behind darkened glass, and as certain types and marks of cars. 
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They may be listening to the same program on their radios, hearing the 
same information about gridlocked traffic in the city, or they may be con-
nected up to their Ipods, playing the same kind of popular music. Music 
helping to isolate them even further from their actual surroundings.  
Or picture a scene with morning commuters in a train, totally 
immersed in free papers with very little real information, ears and minds 
plugged into their Ipods. Or watching videos on their videocapable 
phones. Or acting like idiots talking to themselves using Bluetooth to 
connect to their smart mobile phones, being in their minds somewhere 
else, not here in the train in an anonymous collection of people, but at 
home, with friends, or at work.  
In a way we seem to live more and more of our lives in a kind of vir-
tual communities. Virtual communities of people not actually together at 
the same location most of the time, but connected through phones, Inter-
net or some other technical means of communication. In reality discon-
nected voices, pictures or SMS Volapük. Or virtual communities of peo-
ple doing the same thing like jogging, skiing, riding or Harley Davidson 
motorbikes.  
“As the close bonds of communities wither away, people survive the 
new order of weak communities by a continuous re-expression of self to 
transient audiences. They dress up, now as skiers who never ski, now as 
pilots who cannot fly, now as soldiers who never see army life, in search 
for the expression of individualism bound up in fantasy status. They dis-
cover community through the community of shared brands: brands link 
consumers via promotion to similar others.”
60 
One may wonder whether this picture of skiers who never ski, pilots 
who never fly, and soldiers who never soldier is a picture of the modern 
version of the ships of fools?  
It is as if the combination of loosely coupled, irresponsible individu-
alism and collectivist institutions having the responsibility to take care of 
everyone is resulting in a kind of meaningless individualism. 
 What we have is neither the self confident and self-reliant individual-
ism of Locke or Mill, nor would it seem, the more moderate version 
found in von Mises’ and Hayek’s theories.  
What we have instead is apparently a more superficial narcissistic, 
hedonistic and irresponsible individualism, in which the individual no 
longer seems to be dependent on any other individual and no other indi-
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vidual seems dependent on him. Not a family, not a group, not friends, 
not any concrete person. 
 Likewise values and norms have become so general and moved so far 
back in our minds that we no longer recognise their importance. To the 
individual social institutions may seem to have their own lives, not 
dependent on the activity of any one individual. 
 A spider’s web of dependencies 
 As we have mentioned before, there is something strange here. It would 
seem that there is an enormous difference between the picture of the indi-
vidual envisaged in our discussion of individualism, and the free floating 
individuals we are talking about here. Modern individuals are not sover-
eign, they have in a certain sense never been more dependent on the sur-
rounding society than now. We are enmeshed in a spider’s web of rela-
tions, even though every one of these relations may look unimportant, 
because they can be exchanged for some other relation. 
 “The cultural conception of autonomous individuality is at odds with 
the social constructivist assertion that self and society are crucially inter-
dependent. This is particularly true in modern and post-modern society, 
where individuals are inextricably immersed in society, due to such large-
scale factors as ever-growing economic interdependence, mass-produced 
goods, or the influence of the mass media, experts and science.”
61  
 If this is the case, how can we act as free floating individuals? The 
resolution of this paradox is that we may be dependent on others, but it 
seems that all dependencies can be exchanged or substituted by another 
dependency. This may create the superficial impression that we are not 
dependent on anyone or anything. We have become choosers and con-
sumers of our own life. 
 We can choose to create a child in the old fashioned way, or we can 
choose to carry out in vitro fertilisation, or even have another woman 
carry the baby. We can choose hospitals and doctors. We can let the child 
be looked after in our choice of kindergarten. The child itself can choose 
amongst a bewildering array of possibilities, playthings, schools, friends 
and educations. We can choose the religion in vogue at the moment, and 
a passing political conviction. We can choose the right kind of people to 
network with, people like ourselves, and call them our friends. We can 
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drop out of work for a while and find something else to do. We can 
design our own future, and the possibilities seem endless. 
 We can choose the place and style we want to live in, the means of 
transport that we prefer, the kind of car that fits our lifestyle. We can live 
in several places, moving with the seasons. We can roam the world, 
nothing is too far away, we can listen to our kind of music wherever we 
please, see the movies we prefer. We can eat dishes seen as exotic, 
although they can be had everywhere, and sip wine from all parts of the 
globe. We can play skiing, piloting and soldiering on our vacations.  
 We can insure ourselves against any conceivable mishap and then 
some. When we leave work we can become zoomers, replacing the parts 
of our bodies that bother us, and be made to look as new.  
When we depart we can choose to have our ashes shot into space thus 
really returning to dust, or we can have a mausoleum built to remind peo-
ple of our selves. 
Choices, choices everywhere. Everything is up for grabs. Is that not 
heaven for an individual? 
 What we do not see is how dependent we have become on the afore-
mentioned spider’s web of relations. The choices we can make mask how 
much we depend on others. On the surface nothing seems fixed, there are 
always possibilities. 
A closer look will reveal a different reality. It will reveal an individual 
that may never have been more dependent on others, almost as dependent 
as a child or a genuine fool. 
 We depend on myriads of other people in our society and scores of 
others living in other societies. 
Look at the apparatus that is necessary for in vitro fertilisation, or 
giving birth at a hospital.  
Think about the world connections that are necessary to produce just 
the simplest things that we use everyday. For every choice we can think 
of, we can make a cascading list of necessary dependencies. 
 It is not just a question of material needs though. We may be used to 
live in stable societies, in which we can make plans for the future and 
expect to fulfil them. We live in societies in which relations between the 
individuals are well-ordered, we know what to expect, and we know that 
we can usually trust others in our dealings with them. 33 
 We are secure in our lives and know that there are safety nets under-
neath our efforts, made up of complicated systems of institutions. Being 
looked after by institution after institution from birth to death. 
In other words we are more than ever dependent on others, on social 
institutions and the shared values and ideas that make this possible. 
Losing a sense of purpose 
What happens if we no longer see the fine web of connections that make 
up a society. What happens if the individualistic and narcissistic tenden-
cies discussed in the previous section run amok? What happens if we 
ignore these dependencies and become the free floating individuals we 
have talked about? 
 Cutting the remnants of the connections to shared values and norms 
may result in losing a sense of purpose. To achieve something is to 
achieve something worthwhile. To get a sense of fulfilment there must be 
some value attached to the fulfilment. Values do not float in air though, 
values are part of the social phenomena we have talked about earlier. 
That something is valuable would seem to imply that it is collectively 
seen as having value. Valuing is done by the collective.  
Losing a sense of the shared value must mean that one’s individual 
achievements in a way become meaningless. What is the sense in panning 
for lumps of gold, if say nobody else values gold?  
Durkheim may once have thought of similar questions in his discus-
sion of causes for anomie. Anomie refers to a situation in which the social 
norms in a society dissolve with the result that nothing is guiding and 
limiting the individuals living in that society. 
 In “Suicide” Durkheim states that there is no evident limit to man’s 
appetite for more of everything, just like we discussed in the previous 
section. “Nothing appears in man's organic nor in his psychological con-
stitution which sets a limit to such tendencies. The functioning of indi-
vidual life does not require them to cease at one point rather than at 
another; … It is not human nature which can assign the variable limits 
necessary to our needs. They are thus unlimited so far as they depend on 
the individual alone. Irrespective of any external regulatory force, our 
capacity for feeling is in itself an insatiable and bottomless abyss.”
62  
                                           
62 Durkheim, Èmile. 1897. Suicide: A Study in Sociology. London: Routldge and Kegan Paul, 
p. 246/47. 34 
If nothing limits man’s appetite this in itself becomes a source of tor-
ment to man. Like in the discussion of narcissistic tendencies, it will 
never be possible to fulfil every need. Thus the appetites cannot be 
quenched. We may add that one of the problems with the attempt to 
quench them is that everybody else is engaged in the same futile effort. 
Like individuals in a crowd attempting to stand on their toes to get a bet-
ter view, with the collective result that no one is better off. This illustrates 
also the problems with positional goods. Nothing is achieved, except that 
everyone will be frustrated in their individual attempts to better their 
situation. 
Another problem may arise even if we succeed in getting to stand 
higher than others in the crowd. We may discover that there is nothing to 
see. Meaning that our efforts do not seem to result in any fulfilment. 
Standing on one’s toes is not enough, there must be a purpose to standing 
on one’s toes, there must be something worth seeing. 
“All man's pleasure in acting, moving and exerting himself implies the 
sense that his efforts are not in vain and that by walking he has advanced. 
However, one does not advance when one walks toward no goal, or--
which is the same thing--when his goal is infinity.”
63  
Durkheim reaches the conclusion that man’s appetite must be guided 
and limited by something outside individual man. “It is not true, then, that 
human activity can be released from all restraint. Nothing in the world 
can enjoy such a privilege. All existence being a part of the universe is 
relative to the remainder; its nature and method of manifestation accord-
ingly depend not only on itself but on other beings, who consequently 
restrain and regulate it.”
64 
Durkheim mentions in passing that physical restraints cannot be 
effective in limiting the appetite of individuals, because he says, “hearts 
cannot be touched by physico-chemical forces.” While this may sound 
poetic, I am sure he is right. It does not really help us understand the 
nature of the guidance and limits that must be set from the outside.  
 Let us cast a glance back at the discussion of individualism, at the 
cathedral building, a very physical object. Here the guidance and limita-
tions come from shared vision or more precisely a plan for the cathedral. 
This at least gives direction to the efforts of the individual stone mason.  
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In society shared visions of better life, shared values shaped by our 
collective history, and shared problems, recognised perhaps as problems 
because of shared values, are needed to make the individual efforts 
worthwhile. Religion may once have played that role, but since 
Nietzsche’s cry “ Gott is Tot!” this may longer be the case, at least in the 
more secular Western societies.  
 Shared collective values not only guide our efforts, they also limit the 
excesses of individual self-love, and passions. Only shared values and 
norms can give us something worth striving for in guiding our appetites, 
and at the same time limit individual excesses.  
“Only then can they [appetites] be harmonized with the faculties and 
satisfied. But since the individual has no way of limiting them, this must 
be done by some force exterior to him. A regulative force must play the 
same role for moral needs as the organism plays for physical needs. This 
means that the force can only be moral.”
65 
While Durkheim's idea may be a little out of fashion, we still wrangle 
with problems similar to his. Individuals floating in air and only “united” 
in their patterns of consumption, their life style. Thus we are still looking 
for the intangible phenomena that may guide and limit individual actions, 
uniting them into something worthwhile for all of us. 
 6. Losing a sense of community 
Self-identity cannot just be a question of consumption and possession. 
The story we just told cannot be the whole truth. One’s identity must still 
be connected to more than that. Our gender, ethnic origin, the life we 
have lived, the choices we have made, the things we have done, our work, 
our relations, our family, our culture, our beliefs, religious or otherwise, 
our whole experience and our knowledge, all these things must have con-
tributed to our identity, our sense of self.  
Many of these influences make up a kind of social embeddedness. We 
are individuals in a family, in a group of people close to us, we are 
imprinted with a certain culture. We take part in shared socialisation and 
educational efforts, we contribute collectively to production of something 
in the workplace. We are anchored in beliefs and norms. We show trust in 
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others. We have responsibilities. We belong somewhere, we are embed-
ded in something collective, something that is somehow greater than us. 
 Today a sense of embeddedness seems to be eroding. “Liberal socie-
ties like the United States have a tendency toward individualism and a 
potentially debilitating social atomization… There is evidence that in the 
United States, trust and social habits that underlay its rise to greatness as 
an industrial power have eroded significantly in the past half-century.”
66  
This erosion is today seen as reduction in what is called social capital. 
Although there is some confusion as to what is actually meant by social 
capital.
67 It is not even a new concept, but it becomes popular with Put-
nam’s “Making Democracy Work”
68 and especially of course with his 
book “Bowling Alone.”
69 
 In Putnam’s version “social capital refers to connections among indi-
viduals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthi-
ness that arise from them. In that sense social capital is closely related to 
what some have called “civic virtue.” The difference is that “social capi-
tal” calls attention to the fact that civic virtue is most powerful when em-
bedded in a dense network of reciprocal social relations. A society of 
many virtuous but isolated individuals is not necessarily rich in social 
capital.”
70  
In Putnam’s version social capital seems only to be attached to the 
more superficial aspects of social capital, as he focuses on tangible net-
works of reciprocal social relations. A similar reduction in the concept of 
social capital, is found in Bourdieu’s version as he states: “The volume of 
social capital possessed by a given agent ... depends on the size of the 
network of connections that he can effectively mobilize."
71 In the more 
superficial versions it might be said that “we define individual social 
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capital as a person’s social characteristics–including social skills, cha-
risma, and the size of his Rolodex.”
72. 
Today, Putnam asserts, we are losing the social capital that exists as 
forms of participation in voluntary networks of reciprocal relationships. 
We are bowling alone not in groups. His evidence is fairly simple. In the 
US people are becoming less engaged in voluntary group activities. Peo-
ple are less likely to join unions and professional organisations, less 
likely to take part in organised religious activities, less likely to vote in 
elections, less likely to join clubs, and participate actively in organisa-
tions of which they are members. Less likely to marry. Less likely to 
socialise with others and less likely to trust other people.  
Putnam concludes that the more intangible parts of social capital are 
eroding. I am not sure that we really get any measure of the social capital. 
Unless that is, the whole concept is reduced to mean the number of the 
contacts in the rolodex or the PDA we are carrying.  
This network focus is too simple. Our thesis would be that the number 
of people in one’s network in an age of electronic communication might 
not count for much. There may be hundreds of names in the Contacts list 
“but that is certainly not a sign of the more fundamental aspects of social 
capital, to say nothing about the necessary other-directedness and shared 
values that we were looking for a short while ago. 
 Contacts today may have become easier to store, more fleeting, more 
related to market transactions, or just inactive collections of addresses 
and numbers. Not even the other indicators that Putnam see as declining 
would really seem to indicate the existence or absence of what we are 
looking for. 
It may be difficult to look directly at the amount of trust and the direct 
influence of norms and obligations in guiding and limiting behaviour. It 
is certainly much easier to look at the number of social networks and 
individual participation in those networks and count the number of con-
tacts in a rolodex. The risk is that these networks may tell us very little 
about the deeper layers. The existence of certain networks may have very 
little to do with shared values or even trust. 
Perhaps we should be weary even about the use of the term social 
capital, which has connotations linking it to some measurable stock of 
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capital, like in economics, which would certainly be problematic. Shared 
values and trust are certainly not like a physical stock of capital. 
 The economist Arrow urges the abandonment of the term social 
capital. Solow seems to share this view: “ Why social capital? I think it is 
an attempt to gain conviction from a bad analogy. Generically “capital” 
stands for a stock of produced or natural factors of production that can be 
expected to yield productive services for some time. Originally anyone 
who talked about capital had in mind a stock of tangible, solid, often 
durable things such as buildings, machinery, and inventories.”
73 Solow 
instead uses the term “behaviour patterns”. Not that that would be without 
problems as once more the focus would be on the surface phenomenon, 
more or less like Putnam.  
Neither the World Bank nor the OECD are listening to these objec-
tions. Perhaps for the reason stated by Solow, in order to gain conviction, 
although I think there is more to the term that just an attempt to gain con-
viction. A book on social capital published by the World Bank in certain 
chapters seems to see social capital with the eyes of an economist, thus 
giving the whole concept a certain slant. For instance Coleman asserts 
that “the function identified by the concept of “social capital” is the value 
of these aspects of social structure to actors as resources that they can use 
to achieve their interest.”
74  
In a similar vein The OECD Directorate for Education states: “[T]he 
concept of social capital, which refers to the capacity of people to act 
together, create synergies and build partnerships, is a valuable source of 
organisational capacity and learning. The measurement of its impact on 
economic or social performance is even more challenging than that of 
human capital.”  
This indicates that the OECD has come to realise the importance of 
something more than GDP measures, that social capital and the personal 
version of it, human capital, are seen as important for economic and 
social progress. Thus the growth of social capital is supposed to contrib-
ute to the growth of more traditional forms of capital. In their view of 
social capital they seem to concentrate on exactly the same superficial 
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aspects as Putnam did, and strive to make indicators that will allow the 
direct measurement of social capital and it’s contribution to more general 
measures of welfare. 
In the conceptions presented here social capital is somehow embodied 
in the web of observable connections that individuals have. To Putnam 
trust and values arise from the connections of the web of relations, 
implying that networks are somehow causing trust. The views found in 
the World Bank and the OECD may be more concerned with the aspects 
of social capital promoting economic growth,
75 but like Putnam they 
seem to be mostly concerned with the more superficial aspects that can 
easily be measured and used as a basis for discussing political strategies 
for promoting social capital. 
The deeper layers  
Our understanding of social capital according to which the connections 
depend upon deeper layers of values, trust, and expectations is in fact 
turned upside down by such simple minded views.  
In our view of social capital we must discern more sharply between 
the deep intangible layers and the possible surface expressions, somewhat 




Surface  civic participation in society, social 
networks, rule of law, compliance 
with rules and norms, lack of cor-
ruption, democratic procedures 
Intermediate level  Civic virtues, trust, responsibility, 
obligation 
Deep dispositions  Collective deep values and beliefs, 
culture, basic cooperation, empa-
thy, solidarity, belonging 
 
The deeper layers of social capital would consist of shared social norms 
and obligations mostly tacit, fulfilling the role of guiding and limiting the 
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activities of individuals in a way presumably similar to Durkheim’s 
morality.  
These shared values found in norms and obligations might be funda-
mental in bringing about and preserving a sense of civic duty, a general-
ised reciprocal trust in each other and a sense of one’s responsibilities and 
obligations towards one another in a community. In fact being essential 
for the existence of a community, as something more than a collection of 
individuals. A community, embedding the individual in web of social 
relations. Fukuyama argues that interpersonal trust is important for social 
relationships to emerge. In fact interpersonal trust is seen as fundamental 
to a flourishing economy. As we have asserted earlier without this kindof 
trust it becomes impossible to carry out even simple one-to-one exchan-
ges in society, to say nothing of the complicated net of exchanges in the 
modern market place. “If people who have to work together in an 
enterprise trust one another because they are all operating according to a 
common set of ethical norms, doing business costs less.”
76 Coleman 
argues that “a group whose members manifest trustworthiness and place 
extensive trust in one another will be able to accomplish much more than 
a comparable group lacking that trustworthiness and trust.”
77  
Without a kind of generalized reciprocity and trust it would be diffi-
cult to envisage how markets and democracies could ever have emerged. 
These values help bring about a cohesiveness, creating tolerance towards 
others and helping along integration into coherent wholes, creating the 
sense of community. Even so trust does not seem to play a big role in 
economic theory.
78  
Only on the surface the social capital would be revealed in the social 
relationships found in reciprocal networks of connections between peo-
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ple. In social networks, in civic participation, in the rule of law. Things 
that we can observe and to certain extent measure and compare.  
Uprooting what is socially embedded 
 In the following we shall see how the reduction of social capital to the 
more superficial and observable elements may lead to a rather strange 
perception of what social capital may be and more seriously what we are 
to promote in order to preserve and presumably enlarge social capital. We 
fear that well-meaning efforts using the tools of statistics with little con-
ceptual knowledge may pervert the whole idea of social capital, uprooting 
it from the deep values and the social embeddedness that we see as 
important.  
Although the measurement problems would seem not to have been 
solved, van Schaik
79 mentions that an attractive measurement model 
might include four dimensions consisting of: 1) interpersonal trust, 2) 
institutional trust, 3) participation in civil society (formal and informal), 
and 4) trustworthiness of the respondents themselves. To get an idea of 
the kind of measures used in practice, we might take a closer look at the 
first dimension. Interpersonal trust is measured by asking respondents the 
following question: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people 
can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?" 





  Most people can 
be trusted 
Cannot be too 
careful 
Germany 34.8  65.2 
Great Britain  29.8  70.2 
Spain 38.5  61.5 
Denmark 66.5  33.5 
Iceland 41.1  58.9 
Belarus   41.9  58.1 
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Looking at these numbers it would be difficult to see a relation between 
the answers to the trust question and economic or social performance in 
the respective countries. It is difficult to understand what causes these dif-
ferences. Is the high Danish and in general Scandinavian trust measure 
caused by deeply held and shared moral values, or by public regulation 
and institutionalised responsibility? And what might explain the fairly 
high number for trust in Belarus or conversely the fairly low value in 
Great Britain? Does the Belarus number signify that in a society with low 
general trust the persons that you know are the persons you trust, leading 
respondents to express a moderate trust level? While Britons perhaps 
have less regulation than the Scandinavian countries and less close per-
sonal bonds than people in Belarus. These are just speculations, but they 
perhaps fit the picture painted in my “Otherworldly Economics,”
81 in 
which the assertion is that both a high degree of regulation, and low 
degree of regulation leads to order. Regulation forces a trustworthy order, 
while lack of regulation makes it necessary for people to find trustworthy 
partners. The in between situation would lead to less order with less trust.  
Schaik asserts that the relationship is better with regard to the relation 
between social capital measured as number of active memberships of 
groups and the economic performance of the respective countries, con-
cluding that “social capital in terms of (active) group membership con-
tributes to regional economic growth in Europe.”
82 I am not sure that he 
has shown that this is indeed the case. He has only shown that there 
seems to be a relation between group membership, as measured, and eco-
nomic growth indicators. In fact we do not know what the relationship is, 
or what is causing what. He acknowledges that when he writes: “as long 
as we do not exactly know the mechanism between active membership 
and regional economic growth, it is too early to formulate clear policy 
implications.”
83 Yes indeed! 
The Scandinavian welfare states score high on the Putman indica-
tors.“Comparative studies on trust show that the citizens of the Nordic 
countries belong to the most "trusting" in the world in the Putnamian 
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sense of the word.”
84 Siisiäinen also mentions that “The Nordic countries 
are also among those countries in which no general decline of social 
capital has taken place”. Is that so, or are the measures used incapable of 
telling us anything about the deeper aspects of social capital?  
I fear that this might indeed be the case. Participation in voluntary 
groups may be high in the Scandinavian countries, but it may not signify 
that there is a large amount of social capital. Voluntary groups may con-
sist of associations that do not really have any interest what so ever in the 
society as such, but only in their own benefits. The voluntary groups may 
consist partly of interest groups that are only united by one singular inter-
est and in their claim on other parts of society for support for this interest 
of theirs, acting perhaps as a kind of super-individuals. 
In 2004 there were 14,852 idrætsforeninger (Athletics associations) in 
Denmark. According to DIF (The National Sports Federation) at least 
some of them were very active: “As an example, every year 190,000 
tournament matches under the Danish Football Association are arranged 
for football players of all ages and at all levels. Under the Danish Hand-
ball Association 92,000 tournament matches are played every year, and 
even in the smaller federations the tournament and competition activity is 
extensive.”
85 Support is provided for these associations in varying 
amounts from the public sector.  
 Of course this is a positive sign of voluntary engaging in associations, 
but it says nothing about the interest in society as such or in upholding 
shared values and social institutions. Instead we may get the idea “that 
social capital stands for the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of 
membership in social networks or other social structures.”
86  
 One might easily get the impression that social capital is becoming a 
somewhat ambiguous concept. On the one hand it may represent some-
thing that provides cohesion and helps bring about the otherdirectedness 
we are looking for, on the other hand it contains notions of “what is in it 
for us”.  
If social capital in practical and operational terms is reduced to being a 
relation in associations and networks, I am not sure that it actually pro-
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motes cohesiveness. Rather it may represent a local answer to specific 
problems shared by several individuals. A group interested in motocross 
activities may unite in their effort to get the support from the local coun-
cil to provide them with facilities for their sport. It does not however 
mean that these individuals are engaged in society. They may represent 
the loosely coupled individuals that happen to share this one interest. 
They are not interested in possible negative effects of their activities on 
the rest of the community. They ignore that their activities encroach upon 
the interest of others. Like the interest in living in peaceful and quiet sur-
roundings, not disturbed by motocross motorcycles. 
Further indication that the measure showing that the amount of social 
capital is high in the Scandinavian countries can be misleading, may be 
had from looking at the number of people living as singles in the society, 
or the amount of digital dating attempts.  
Yet another aspect contributing to the decline in the individual 
embeddedness in close social relations may relate to the fact that we are 
living more and more in large agglomerations of people, in cities, in 
which we may mingle with a large number of people every day, without 
knowing more than a very small number of these. We are becoming more 
and more anonymous to each other in the society in which we are living. 
The growing number of connections will hardly represent a contribution 
to social capital, except perhaps in the most superficial sense. In fact one 
is led to the conclusion that economic progress may contribute to the 
decline in close human relations, as found in families and partnerships. 
 If we are right in our interpretation the decline in social capital, not 
the least the deeper aspects of it may be more serious than shown by the 
interpretations and measures used by Putnam and institutions like the 
World bank and OECD. 
The OECD and other institutions may have realised that social and so-
called human capital is important for smooth functioning and cohesive-
ness of societies, but it almost seems as if they do not realise that with 
their main focus on economic cooperation and development, they may 
indirectly contribute to the erosion of existing social capital, and promote 
an even stronger individual self-interest.  
Individuals are reinforced in this attitude by dominating economic 
theory seeing the individual as dominated by self-interest in all areas of 
life. This is the self-love of the baker argument put forward earlier and 45 
discussed more thoroughly in Petersen.
87 Avoiding individual responsibil-
ity, free riding and shirking is seen as advantageous for the individual. 
Although if this becomes general attitude everyone will suffer the effects 
of this. 
With decline in both the superficial and the deeper parts of social 
capital it becomes increasing difficult to solve the social problems that 
demand cooperative actions by the individuals. No one can see their own 
immediate benefit in cooperating voluntarily.  
With less trust in other individuals we will have to create more insti-
tutionalised trust in the shape of a formal set of rules, and institutions 
responsible for the task of making sure that we abide by the rules, and if 
not, meter out sanctions. In other word the less trust we feel toward each 
other, the more we need to build institutions that guarantee our exchanges 
with others, not only in the market but also in other areas.
88  
Designing intricate rules and creating institutions to protect us against 
knavish behaviour may in fact crowd out what civic virtues we may have. 
“As a result, the citizens exploit all legal opportunities to the fullest and 
the constitution is less observed. The effort to constitutionally constrain 
citizens may thus lead to a perverse result. Although a constitution, and 
more generally public laws and regulations, must check against knaves 
and prevent the exploitation of the citizenry by free riders and by profes-
sional politicians, it should also support civic virtues.”
89 
7. Generating Singleness 
The creation of public institutions to take care of every single individual 
need makes all of us individually more independent of each other, as we 
have discussed in the section on free floating individuals. More and more 
public institutions to care for our needs may in fact generate singleness. 
The individual no longer needs the family or the partner. There is no need 
for the security of marriage and the lifelong binding marriage vow – 
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“until death us do part.” Care for children is to a large degree the respon-
sibility of institutions created for that purpose. Old people need no longer 
depend on the their family, neither in the narrow sense of their own chil-
dren, nor in the wider sense of remote relatives. They can be cared for in 
special institutions for the aged and senile. 
With the dissolution of personal bonds further aggravated as we shall 
see by the technological possibilities for living at distance, the individual 
may lose a sense of belonging somewhere. Not belonging to any distinct 
and close entity does of course make the individual even more free, but is 
this a kind of freedom we can wish for? 
Beck talks about a “Vollkasko-individualiserung” in the modern wel-
fare state. It seems evident that this opens up a potential for the break up 
or dissolution of traditional families into singles living either alone or in 
fleeting partnerships of choice. Religious commands, “thou shalt not …”, 
no longer have the power they once had. Religion in some cases may 
become more a matter of convenience, of choice and of what is in vogue.  
The Civitas institution in Great Britain reports that “Marriage and re-
marriage are increasingly being preceded or replaced by cohabiting 
unions. The proportion of single women in cohabiting relationships dou-
bled from 13% in 1986 to 25% in 1999. Cohabiting unions currently 
make up 70% of first partnerships. Although cohabiting recently has 
become more socially acceptable, these types of unions tend to be fragile. 
Cohabitations last an average of two years before dissolving or being 
converted to marriage. Of cohabiting couples who do not marry, only 
about 18% survive at least ten years (compared to 75% of couples who 
marry).”
90 
Or we might take a look at Denmark. In 2006 there were 2.2 million 
one family households, of these 460,332 were households with a single 
male and 618,570 were households with a single woman, married couples 
made up 867,260, while the rest is made up of unmarried couples.
91  
 Political, social and economic development has brought about libera-
tion of the individual in all spheres of life. It has established the individ-
ual as the central unit in a society of individuals. 
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“Die meisten Rechte sind individuelle Rechte. Nicht Familien können 
sie in Anspruch nehmen, sondern eben nur Individuen, genauer: erwerb-
stätige (oder zur Erwerbsarbeit bereite, arbeitslose) Individuen. Die Teil-
nahme an materiellen Sicherungen und Wohltaten des Sozialstaates setzt 
in den allermeisten Fällen Erwerbstätigkeit voraus. Das bestätigt u.a. den 
Streit um die Ausnahmen: Hausarbeitslohn, Hausfrauenrente.”
92 Accord-
ing to Beck the modern welfare state is contributing to the the phenomena 
of “Individualiserung.”  
“Der Sozialstaat ist - vielleicht wider Willen - eine Versuchsanord-
nung zur Konditionierung ichbezogener Lebensweisen. Und man mag das 
Gemeinwohl mit einer Pflichtimpfung in die Herzen der Menschen 
spritzen, diese Litanei der verloren gegangenen Gemeinsamkeit bleibt 
doppelzüngig, doppelmoralisch, solange die »Mechanik« der Individual-
isierung intakt bleibt, und niemand sie wirklich in Frage stellt - dies 
weder will noch kann."
93  
Perhaps the progressive project of making the individual secure and 
independent may have turned into a rather distorted delusion. 
 The looseness of family connections is accompanied by a loosening 
of the connections of the individuals to their jobs and to co-workers or 
colleagues in the workplace. More and more flexibility is demanded of 
the workforce. No longer an individual can expect to keep a certain job 
for a long time. In former times sons might follow their fathers, or uncles, 
or brothers and go to work in the same mine, steelworks or shipyard. 
Nowadays mobility is demanded, with the ability to shift jobs with short 
intervals. Not only that, mobility also means that individuals no longer 
can depend on the special skills belonging to a certain craft or just to a 
certain education. They have to adapt to new and shifting demands, 
learning new knowledge and gaining new skills on the fly.  
In “The corrosion of Character”
94 Sennett talks about a Post-Fordist 
regime. A regime that could perhaps be characterised by all the buzz 
words found in mainstream management to day. From just-in-time, flexi-
ble operations and workforce, lean management, change management, 
knowledge management, project organisation, outsourcing, 
empowerment, to ISO-standards and total quality management.  
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There is an overall trend towards algorithmisation of work processes. 
Meaning that the individual has to follow the detailed commands speci-
fied in the lines of a software program. A program in which he had no 
share and no influence, a program whose purpose he may not see. Mov-
ing to and fro, all in accordance with the way in which the program is 
constructed. At every step the individuals behaviour would be determined 
by the configuration the program was in. 
95 
In a Danish reform of employment agencies, new integrated job-cen-
tres are supposed to screen the unemployed in order to help them in the 
most efficient way. As part of the efficiency drive all jobcentres are to use 
what is called “Visitationsværktøjskassen,” or the screening tool.
96 Part of 
this screening tool consists of a job-barometer program. This barometer 
program is supposed to provide the screener and the unemployed with an 
indication of the chances for new employment within the next six month. 
It has green, yellow and red sectors. If the person being screened is in the 
green sector he would have a good chance of gaining employment within 
the next six months. In the red sector the chances are of course almost 
nonexistent. The whole instrument is based upon statistical data, general 
as well as personal, and it is stated that the job barometer predicts cor-
rectly in 70% of the cases.  
How would the employee doing the screening react when the barome-
ter showed that an unemployed person was in the red sector? Would one 
react by finding ways of bringing the person in question into the yellow 
or green sector, or by concluding that this person had no chance of gain-
ing employment? I fear that such an instrument takes away personal 
judgement and responsibility on behalf of the screener, leaving the deci-
sion to a statistical tool, that shows average probabilities and not the exact 
potential of the person in question. With the emphasis on the use of such 
tools the abilities of the screener become less important.  
Robot-like carrying out of detailed instructions may replace individual 
consideration and thought as in the case of a job-centre screener, who 
knows how to play according to certain rules in the shape of quasi-algo-
rithms. But does he understand the relation to real world problems, or 
worse, will he try to impose the “play” on the real world, thereby ignor-
ing relevant aspects, clues, and information, making it a paper solution? 
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Detailed algorithm-like instructions may lead one to commit a crime of 
non-thinking negligence. 
The problem with such quasi-algorithms is that they promote a head-
under-the-arm-attitude and erosion of every kind of individual responsi-
bility. Instead of having the individual responsibility to act according to 
certain general norms and values, an employee now only has to observe 
the rules of the program, whether they are relevant or not. Individual 
responsibility, insight and forethought are not really demanded as the 
procedures are described in detail.  
If we carry this tendency a little further we might see that the individ-
ual no longer has to relate directly to his fellow employees, the algorithm 
becomes the intermediary. Not the product or the service, but the program 
that specifies the procedures, is the thing that unifies the work of the indi-
viduals. Much more sophisticated than any assembly line has ever been. 
The exception to this may be the production of the algorithm and program 
itself.  
To all this may be added the vagaries of globalisation, with global 
division of work, movements of jobs, companies and capital across bor-
ders, in rolling waves of opportunities, somewhat like swarms of locusts 
grazing off the opportunities and then moving on to new green patches. 
 To the individual it means that all aspects of work become unpredict-
able and loose, and the individual has to engage in almost perpetual 
adjustment to these vagaries. We have seen how the individual appeared 
to become free floating and independent. For every relation the individual 
may engage in it is possible to find a substitute. Now every single indi-
vidual itself with his skills and knowledge may have become substitut-
able to a degree never before seen.  
 Highly skilled software designers in a high wage country may lose 
their jobs over night to an equally skilled group of software engineers in 
Bangalore. Craftsmen may be substituted by robots following unwavering 
algorithms and by push button operators. The perpetual adjustments and 
changes brought about by this may paradoxically mean that the individual 
might have an incentive to enlarge his superficial network of people he 
knows. The network might help him to counter the vagaries of the work 
life, with the possibility of activating network links making it easier to 
find a new job. 50 
The corrosion of character 
All these developments contribute to a corrosion of character. With char-
acter consisting of "the ethical value we place on our own desires and on 
our relations to others. They are the personal traits that we value in our-
selves and for which we seek to be valued by others."
97 This is what 
makes us capable of making and keeping commitments, it provides de-
pendability, consistency and coherence to our lives.  
Character cannot be seen in isolation from the concept of the deeply 
held values that we discussed in a previous section. Character in our view 
is a lasting commitment to these deep values.  
These values are being eroded because character and the attachment to 
the deeper values are no longer valued. A job no longer has to depend on 
the individual sense of responsibility, on commitment and character. 
Sennett argues that in order for us to be reliable as individuals we must 
feel needed, and this is no longer the case. To Sennett a regime "which 
provides human beings no deep reasons to care about one another cannot 
long preserve its legitimacy."
98  
The loosening of specific ties to a family and to work is accompanied 
by other tendencies that may contribute to a life lived at a distance. Like 
the development of the computer, broadband technologies, mobile phones 
and video communication devices, of the Internet, of programs for com-
municating, sharing and chatting. 
It is now possible to work at a distance, living in the Outer Hebrides 
and participating in virtual work groups in the US for instance. Or col-
laborating on the development of an avarian flue vaccine with people all 
over the Earth, without ever having to meet them face to face, except on a 
video connection.  
 It is possible to learn at distance, participating in class discussion with 
a remote teacher, following lectures of university professors located in 
other countries collaborating on group tasks, watching each others pres-
entation, take exams, all more or less at one’s own pace.  
It is possible to socialise at a distance, participating in chat rooms, 
adventure games or poker games with others whose identity may remain 
for ever hidden, behind strange sounding names and characteristics. 
Internet shopping relieves one of the tedious business of going to a shop. 
                                           
97 Sennett, R. (1998). The Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences of Work in the 
New Capitalism: W. W. Norton 
98 Ibid. 51 
Remote diagnosis and some sort of self-treatment programs might make 
at least some of the trips to a doctor or hospital superfluous. 
Dating at a distance is possible with ever more popular and specialised 
dating services, to help speed up the matching characteristics, although 
presumably the intention here is still to meet face to face with some of the 
persons found with the help perhaps of matching algorithms. Virtual 
mating might perhaps be seen as a logical next step. 
 In a not too distant future I suspect it will become possible to live a 
large part of one’s life in a kind of virtual life, being only connected to 
the outside world through one’s computer, with lots of connections to 
virtual friends, but no close connection to anyone. I emphasise possible 
because I believe that to most people close relations and face to face 
communication cannot really be substituted by virtual relations and video 
dialogues. 
 A study of trust development in dilemma games comparing the results 
from three different computer-mediated communications channels in the 
shape of text based, audio and video channels and face to face communi-
cation concluded: “Communication media makes a difference in trust 
development, and all mediated communications tested in this experiment 
had some disadvantages when compared to face-to-face communication. 
Groups using text chat did the worst, having the most difficulty estab-
lishing high trust based cooperation in the Daytrader social dilemma.”
99  
Apparently opportunistic behaviour showed up when using communi-
cation in channels conveying only text and or audio. From this we draw 
the conclusion that living, and cooperating at a distance, may contribute 
to the corrosion of character and of the deeper values we have been talk-
ing about.  
This seems to be confirmed by a real life study comparing cooperation 
and development of trust in Computer-Mediated Communication (CMC) 
with face-to-face communication. “CMC groups take longer to develop 
interpersonal relationships and task commitment. Subsequently, lower 
levels of task and social cohesion initially in CMC groups may result in 
diminished performance on interactive tasks and other factors associated 
with cohesion such as organizational commitment, group satisfaction 
                                           
99 Bos, N., Olson, J., Darren Gergle, Olson, G., & Wright, Z. (2002). Effects of Four 
Computer-Mediated Communications Channels on Trust Development. Ann Arbor, MI: 
Collaboratory for Research on Electronic Work (CREW), School of Information, University 
of Michigan, p. 5.  52 
with goals and group effectiveness. CMC groups may also show an initial 
increase in absenteeism and low productivity.”
100  
The somewhat surprising conclusion of the authors seems to be that 
CMC works best when given sufficient time to develop cohesion based 
upon trust and higher productivity based upon involvement and non 
opportunistic behaviour of the individuals separated by distance. It seems 
paradoxical that technologies designed for flexibility and speed demand 
long term connections in order to counteract lack of trust and opportunis-
tic behaviour. While face to face communication can work also for col-
laborative efforts with a short time horizon.  
It is evident that all those developments that make life at a distance 
possible may have a lot of actual and potential positive effects, contrib-
uting to more comfortable life, to the possibility of staying in contact and 
collaborating with others wherever they are located, learning about life 
and culture in far off places, and much more. 
The potential downside is that the same possibilities set the individual 
free in the sense that there is less and less need for the individual to inter-
act, talk, collaborate, live with, and be dependent on other individuals in 
the sense of being physically close to others. Less and less sense of 
belonging anywhere. This may be detrimental to the development of 
character and the deeper values, as well as socialisation in general. 
“A sense of belonging is something humans need if they are to com-
mit themselves to more than simple selfishness. Families and family 
businesses know something about the sense of belonging and the moti-
vating force of collective pride in the family tradition, as well as the 
responsibilities that go with belonging. Families, at their best, are com-
munities built on mutual trust. If the family could be extended to include 
key contributors, the sense of belonging would be properly inclusive. 
Without some real sense of belonging, virtuality looks like a very pre-
carious state and a perilous base for the next phase of capitalism, what-
ever the economic and technological advantages.”
101  
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Imprinting values  
Elsewhere we have tried to show how children develop an early under-
standing of the view of other persons together with notions of helping, of 
justice and fairness, of claims, of feeling perception and inner states, of 
self and self-interest, and a host of other notions. Four features of this 
understanding stand out: understanding others’ feelings, understanding 
others’ goals, understanding social norms and understanding others’ 
minds.  
This understanding must necessarily include the ability to compare, to 
calculate, to assign weight with regard to relevance, seriousness and so 
on. It would seem that without these abilities it would be impossible to 
get to a sense of justice, for instance when deciding what a fair share 
would be. 
Perhaps situatedness is important also for ethical proficiency. Thus all 
constituent parts of the moral fabric are inextricably a product of the 
activity and situations in which they are produced and used. Because new 
situations, negotiations and activities are recast in a new, more densely 




103 has pointed to the importance of language and culture for 
development of mind. His work has influenced theories of mental devel-
opment and of learning, underlining the importance of situatedness. 
Bruner does the same when he states that culture though formed by men 
also forms man. According to this view “learning and thinking are always 
situated in a cultural setting and always dependent upon the utilization of 
cultural resources.”
104  
Interestingly this would indicate that the environment must have some 
structure or coherence, or there would be nothing to internalise. A chaotic 
or multistructured environment may thus presumably make it impossible 
to get a coherent sense of the moral fabric. Somewhat flippantly one may 
say that it would be equivalent to using many different objects to imprint 
on at the same time in one of Konrad Lorenz’s experiments with 
imprinting. 
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 One of the most serious problems with living at a distance might be 
that it might become impossible to gain any coherent sense of the moral 
fabric. In fact it may be impossible to say what one is imprinted with, to 
use the Lorentz terminology. One thing is for sure though an individual 
no longer enmeshed in a close web of relations with other people, is no 
longer subject to mutual adjustments to one another and self-correcting 
activities found in a tight group. An individual in a group with individuals 
that are close has to gain, like the child in a family, an understanding of 
others’ feelings, understanding of others’ goals, understanding of social 
norms and an understanding of others’ minds.
 
 One wonders what may happen if the individual living at a distance 
no longer feels the same need to show this understanding. A coherent 
character may no longer be necessary. The individual can put on a mask 
and play saint one day in one virtual group and act like a rascal the next 
day in another group. He is no longer held to account by people physi-
cally close. 
 This would have serious effects on the cohesiveness of societies, 
making ever more regulation and control necessary in order to ensure the 
compliance with explicit rules necessary for this cohesiveness.  
8. The dissolution of the individual  
The discussion until now has focused on the individual and the trends 
towards “Individualisierung” and the movement away from a sense of 
belonging to a community. This may no longer be enough. If we place the 
individual under a kind of magnifying glass we may discover that the 
individual itself is dissolving. Not so much in the physical or biological 
sense. Although there may be an increasing tendency to see the individual 
as consisting of a collection of replaceable parts, somewhat like a car. 
Just think of the advances in organ transplants, the latest apparently being 
the possibility of having one person’s face grafted to another persons 
head. At least that would change the look of that individual radically. 
An assembly of masks 
It is something else though that we see the vague contours of under the 
magnifying glass. It is the dissolution of the individual in an assembly of 
roles. Roles related to the development of modern society with increasing 
anonymity and fragmentation, caused not only by division of work, but of 55 
the division of life in separate activities, and agglomeration of these 
activities in ever changing combinations. It seems that we no longer need 
to be seen and act as whole individuals, only certain aspects of an indi-
vidual are needed in those different activities. There is no longer any need 
to see the individual as an individual with certain consistent traits and an 
individual history. Instead we become just collections of activities and 
superficial symbols, seen for instance in what we consume. 
We become a collection of masks consisting of views, behaviours and 
attitudes belonging to a chosen role. When that happens society turns into 
a masquerade with some of the characteristic of an adventure game where 
unknown players are hiding behind a collection of chosen characteristics, 
a role. Actually the Latin word persona originally meant character in a 
drama, with the word perhaps borrowed from the Etruscan “phersu” 
meaning mask. Dittmar talks of the “shifting, multiple, identities we 
attempt to create, negotiate and maintain in an increasingly fragmented 
society, not the least through the socially shared meaning of material 
objects and consumption.”
105  
In a world of strangers this masquerade becomes more and more easy 
to play, as the individual can play according to what is convenient at any 
given moment. The audience only has the mask to go by when judging 
whether one is genuine or not. Meaning of course that superficial masks 
and the right acting become important if one is to convince others. Situ-
ational awareness, and appearances become more important than sincer-
ity, commitment to deep values, or one’s actions in the past. 
 “In a milieu of strangers, the people who witness one’s actions, decla-
rations, and professions usually have no knowledge of one’s history, and 
no experience of similar actions, declarations , and professions in one’s 
past; thus it becomes difficult for this audience to judge, by an external 
standard of experience with a particular person, whether he is to be 
believed or not in a given situation.”
106  
Of course the more we participate in this masquerade the more we 
lose a sense of being more than the collection of masks, an appearance 
with no being behind it. The masks and the roles we are playing take 
over. In essence we become the masks.  
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We act in accordance with the mask we carry at a given moment. As a 
parent of a child with a ADHD syndrome we demand special facilities 
and care, while at the same time trying to keep costs under control as 
members of the school board. Driving the new fast car we may fume 
about the speed bumps popping up like pimples everywhere, forgetting 
that we took the initiative in writing a petition and collecting signatures to 
be sent to the local authorities, demanding that something should be done 
about speeding motorists on our quiet residential road. Finally, as patients 
waiting in line we may certainly see the need for good hospital care, 
while as taxpayers we fight against tax increases to be used for what 
might be the local version of the NHS.  
What I am asserting is that in our separate masks we are playing a 
kind of prisoner’s dilemma game against ourselves. The players in this 
game are represented by the different masks we carry. If we follow a 
strategy of defection we are in fact defecting on the other masks we carry.  
In this way we lose all sense of relatedness, of coherence, and of the 
common good, whatever that may be. One of the consequences is that 
bigger and bigger gaps can develop between the expectations and de-
mands we have when carrying one mask and the results we experience 
when carrying other masks. We will not even be able to act in solidarity 
with ourselves. When that happens, we will all experience the bad results 
of an expansive defection strategy. It will not be easy to see that part of 
the problem lies with ourselves. Instead we may increase our demands. 
The politicians have to do more, the authorities, the police, the compa-
nies, the management of the company in which we work.  
What we have here may only be a mocking trick-mirror of what I call 
mask-egoism. It may not be totally correct as a mirror. It may enlarge 
certain problematic features. Nevertheless, I believe that traits of this 
mask-individualism can be found in most modern societies. 
Mask-egoism may multiply the expectations, wishes, demands and 
needs that we have. They are directed towards somebody else, towards 
the local council, towards the schools, towards management, towards the 
social institutions, towards the state, towards everyone else that is, than 
ourselves.  
We may act opportunistically without realising that we are cheating on 
ourselves. Engaging in smart tax evasion schemes, while at the same time 
demanding more of the services paid for by taxation. If we can get a con-
crete advantage by cheating this system or by getting something appar-57 
ently for free, we cannot be bothered with the diffuse and very small dis-
advantage that everyone else incurs because of that. No concrete person is 
really hurt. It is still a game with a large and dumb opponent. One can 
cheat on the sucker time and time again, and it does not seem to mind. 
What a game. The trick is that one is not playing against another person, 
who would soon change his or her tactics to suit yours in a repeated 
game.  
Who and what can make sure that there is some kind of relatedness, of 
coherence, and some idea of a common good? If I am right, the onerous 
responsibility falls to an increasing degree on the institutions, and then we 
are back with the problem of institutional responsibility. Not only that, 
politicians may also be part of the game, no longer representing individ-
ual voters, but increasingly strong groups of individuals carrying a certain 
kind of mask and characterised by having a loud voice.  
The result is that we do not see that many of the things we do not like 
or do not accept are a direct or indirect consequence of our own behav-
iour. We just put on our mask and ask “What is best for me? Or what is in 
it for me?”, which is exactly the attitude that may have created some of 
the problems in the first place. 
Components of personality 
Quite another way of dissolving the individual is represented by the many 
attempts to break up the individual into types and type components or 
personality traits according to a limited number of criteria. Using an arse-
nal of more or less unfounded psychometric tests and the categorising 
resulting from these tests. 
 Hsu describes how personality tests have become a short cut. “There 
are now such large numbers of people in our schools, corporations and 
legal system, we need a way to screen them, and these tests ask what 
we’er all like as people and provide a neat tidy label.”
107 Hsu also 
describes the controversial use of personality tests in high stake situa-
tions, in job interviews, parole hearings and court cases in the US. 
In 2004 U.S. News and World report estimated that the MBTI test was 
taken by more than 2,5 million people a year in the US, and that the per-
sonality testing industry was growing at an estimated rate of 10 percent a 
year.
108  
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 One of the most well-known and widely used of these tests is the so-
called MBTI, or Myers-Briggs Type Indicator.
109 MBTI was developed 
by one Katharine Cook Briggs and her daughter Isabel Briggs Myers 
during World War II.  
Myers and Myers assert that the personality people is not due to 
chance but is related to a few basic mental characteristics. It is supposed 
to be based upon the work of Jung
110 on personality and psychological 
types. Psychological type referring to the inborn individual preferences.  
Using what I perceive to be vague and precarious arguments suppos-
edly based upon Jung’s types MBTI categorises people into 16 types 
based upon the following binary categories 
 
Sensation (S) – Intuition (N). 
Thinking (T) – Feeling (F) 
Extravert (E)– Introvert (I) 
Judgement (J)– Perception (P) 
 
MBTI is seen as a tool that may help individuals and organisations in 
many ways. It may help people to understand their preferences and 
behaviour. It may enhance communication. Identify potential sources of 
conflict. Help individuals identify careers that match their preferences. 
Optimise the use of the respective individual preferences in an organisa-
tional setting. Help us to understand how the different personalities react 
to different situations, like crisis or stress.  
Popular is the use MBTI in relation to management. For instance 
relating MBTI types to management effectiveness, decision-making, con-
flict management and of course to leadership quality. Businesses are 
using MBTI and other tests in connection with team building and the 
creation of groups.
111 Zemke describes how team members who must 
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work closely together “are given copies of the instrument to fill out. 
Then, as a group, they are led through exercises and explanations that 
impress upon them how the panoply of psychological types on the team 
can be both a barrier and an asset to working together effectively.”
112  
These uses indicate that MBTI categorisation can influence careers, 
leadership selection, creation of teams, conflict resolution etc. All pre-
sumably in order to enhance effectiveness and efficiency. 
Recently the MBTI has also been used by online dating services for a 
kind of matchmaking. PerfectMatch.com’s CEO argues: “We developed a 
Myers-Briggs type of indicator focusing on relationships. It's called the 
Duet Total Compatibility System. We have a 15-20 minute test on the site 
– it's comprehensive, not exhaustive. It gives us a snapshot of whom our 
members are, personality-wise, and how they might relate to others based 
on these factors. Over the past year, many dating sites are launching these 
types of tests. What we want to do is also to take the next step and search 
for individual matches based on the information they give us.”
113  
Mirrors distorting personality 
With all these potential uses it is no wonder that MBTI has come to be 
regarded as a kind of Swiss army knife for psychometric testing. No 
wonder that it has become an important element of the arsenal of tools 
used by consultants all over the world. 
 Still the widespread use does not guarantee that this is a serious 
tool
114. In fact there may be cause for alarm. Taking a look at the fanciful 
verbal descriptions of the different types one is immediately reminded of 
the descriptions found in a horoscope. There is something in there that 
seems to fit any individual in a very glib way. One just has to focus on 
the parts that one recognises as fitting.  
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Case and Philipsson
115 argue that Jung’s types “actually inherited and 
reproduced concepts of astrological and alchemical cosmology” due to 
his interest in alchemy and astrology. Thus “contemporary users of the 
MBTI are inadvertently conducting a form of astrological character 
analysis.” 
 Scientifically the problem is that MBTI does not seem to have any 
serious supporting theory behind it. Even Jung seemed cautious about the 
typology upon which the MBTI is created. It “is only a scheme of orien-
tation. There is such a factor as introversion, there is such a factor as 
extraversion. The classification of individuals means nothing, nothing at 
all. It is only the instrumentarium for the practical psychologist to explain 
for instance, the husband to a wife or vice versa.”
116  
According to Michael
117 research has questioned the validity of MBTI 
and also criticized its use far beyond Jung’s original intent.  
 Rings writes: “[T]he great challenge in the development of the MBTI, 
designed to ascertain as correctly as possible the true personality prefer-
ences of an individual, is that its validity is based upon the validity of the 
very constructs of type it seeks to identify. For the one who does not 
accept the basic assumptions inherent in the theory, no amount of data, 
however vast, will be sufficient support for the instrument’s validity.”
118 
To illustrate some of the problems with MBTI think for a moment of 
the flawed, distorting mirrors that may be found at a fun fair. One mirror 
may show a person as small fat individual with a bulging middle part and 
very short legs, while another mirror may show the same person as a thin 
individual with a long lean body, albeit perhaps with a very large head, or 
some other part made prominent. 
 Now if the MBTI works a little like the house of mirrors it may 
reflect a rather distorted picture of the individual, indicating that its 
validity would be low. In a house of real mirrors this might pose no real 
problem. We know how we can identify a mirror that could be assumed 
not to be distorting, and thus used to correct the reflections shown by all 
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the distorted mirrors. In a test of personality type it would prove much 
more difficult to guarantee that a mirror is not distorting. 
 It would not help that the same mirrors, or in this case the tests, 
showed the same picture every time the test was used, that might indicate 
a reliable test, but would not help us in finding out how the person would 
look in a flat non distorting mirror, or a valid test. 
 Next problem. How does the reflection a mirror provides influence 
the view of that individual? If I can only se myself in distorted mirrors, 
will I not come to have a distorted view of myself? A view influencing 
my whole life. Even more problematic, other people might begin to trust 
the mirror reflections, seeing and reacting to my reflection instead of the 
original. 
The recognition and confirmation of some personality traits in the mir-
rors of the test may convince the individual that these features are impor-
tant. Strengthening the belief that they might serve as something on 
which to base action. “I am doing this, because it fits my ENFP type.” If 
that were to be the case it would confirm our fears that the pigeonholing 
might serve to enhance and enlarge features almost like a caricature 
might do. Tests like the MBTI may indeed have become all things to all 
people. There is always something in there that one can recognise, 
something that can confirm what one already knows. 
It is possible that widespread belief in and use of test like these might 
lead to self-fulfilling prophecies. A self-fulfilling prophecy in which “a 
false definition of a situation [is] evoking a behavior which makes the 
originally false conception come true.”
119 Like the self-fulfilling prophe-
cies of other theories of behaviour.  
Still it is evident that personality testing and self-assessment tools 
have become all the rage, and one can really choose an instrument suiting 
one’s temper and Wallet among a surprising array of tests with exotic 
names and more or less occult underpinnings.  
Individuals can be cast into one of 16 roles as it is done in the MBTI 
test. Or the 9 team roles of the Belbin test, adorned with names like Plant, 
Monitor, Shaper Completer and so forth. Or choose to use the even more 
fanciful Enneagram types like Caretaker, Suceeder, Devil’s advocate, 
Adventurer, Peacemaker etc.  
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None with much in the way of scientific psychological evidence. Per-
haps the really important task today is not to validate this or that test. The 
really important question to answer is: Why have such tests become so 
popular?  
The intangible aspects of personality, the impossibility of hearing, 
seeing, tasting or feeling it, create excellent possibilities for cunning tai-
lors to create tests that demand the “expertise” of exactly those tailor’s or 
at least their certified apprentices in order to administer and interpret.  
 Perhaps all these attempts to disassemble the individual into discrimi-
nate elements of sensing, intuition, thinking, feeling will contribute to 
dissolution of the individual.  
10. Thinking alike - of parrots and peacocks  
Why do we act so foolishly? Supposing that others can see that there are 
serious problems with the personality test we have just been discussing, 
one may wonder like the psychologists reporting on the use of MBTI 
“why the instrument is used so widely, particularly in large organiza-
tions.”  
Why do intelligent people invest so much trust and effort in tests like 
the ones we have just been describing?  
 Reaching further back one may ask why people have become so 
obsessed with the “because I am worth it” activities, rearranging and 
streamlining as it were their bodies to the same stereotype? 
 Or one might quite simply wonder why so many women in western-
ised societies today (2006) are buying and walking around in shoes with 
pointed tips that seem to reach 10 centimetres or more in front of their 
toes. Almost like 15
th century beak shoes with pointed tips bending 
backwards. The immediate answer to this question is of course that 
“fashion dictates.” 
 From Fashion.about.com we learn that for the spring of 2006 the 
fashion dictate for women’s shoes sounds like this: “Forget about delicate 
heels and dainty soles: the hottest footwear trends feature a thick footbed 
(or platform) and/or wedge heels. From rope-wrapped espadrilles to sexy 
evening platforms, these shoes are the perfect balance for spring's roman-
tic blouses and dresses.” 63 
 Now if women trying to get a little ahead of the rest were to follow 
this dictate they would to their dismay discover that many had the same 
idea.  
Is it a similar mechanism that dictates that we invest in personality 
tests categorising us by four letter words? Four letter words that we can 
wear proudly on our T shirts, print on coffee cups or have made into a 
charm.  
Or makes us use the paraphernalia of instruments and tools found for 
instance in management and in organisations? Like balanced scorecards, 
which look like a miniature version of a command economy, or knowl-
edge management, even though we barely know what knowledge is, 
much less how it is brought about, or incentive systems focusing on the 
individual, even though it may destroy cooperation among individuals. 
What is the cause and source of this infatuation with tools whose contri-
bution to efficiency and effectiveness may seem very doubtful? 
Today trends and fashions, whether of shoes, psychological tests, 
management tools, or beliefs in general are becoming world wide syn-
chronised phenomena. That this is possible may be easy to understand, 
given the reach of modern media and communication devices and the 
intense interconnections between almost every part of the world, or at 
least the economically developed parts of the world.  
Still, that does not explain why we, the individual decision makers, 
jump the band-wagon. Where has the independent and self-confident 
individual gone? On the surface this personality may seem to have been 
reduced to a kind of stereotype, stamped with the same fashion element 
that everyone else is wearing. 
 Looking for ways to understand this thinking alike, this looking alike, 
this parroting, this herding, we may be able to discern a series of interre-
lated explanations.  
These explanations may be grouped under the following headings:  
 
-  Acting alike,  
-  Thinking and believing alike,  
-  Reacting alike to shared problems and challenges, and finally 
rather self-explanatory,  
- Forced  conformity. 
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 We shall try to explore these different avenues with the main focus on 
those explanations which may explain why we voluntarily react alike or 
think alike, in order to understand why we all engage in similar follies at 
the same time.  
Acting alike  
Here the important idea is that each individual may possess individual 
information, knowledge, beliefs or convictions, but knowingly ignore 
this. This would mean: 
Adaptation and following the examples set by others, avoiding or 
ignoring one’s own independent ideas, thoughts, knowledge, and experi-
ence. This is a phenomenon that we might refer to as information cas-
cades.  
For instance carrying and opening an umbrella, imitating others who 
are still carrying open umbrellas, ignoring one’s own realisation that it is 
not raining anymore. 
A variation of this might include actively wanting to belong, to be 
accepted by others, by one’s peers, in a kind of reputation cascade. This 
would mean that potential different ideas and opinions of one’s own 
would be suppressed.  
In umbrella terms: Not choosing an umbrella in outrageous colours for 
instance, when you see that those before you have bought grey or black 
umbrellas. 
In a curious way conformity in behaviour might also be a result of 
individuals striving to be different, to get ahead of the rest, to stand on 
one’s toes to see further. To get ahead of the rest one buys the latest in 
umbrella technology, and soon discovers that many others have had 
exactly the same idea.  
In the 1950’s Asch
120 made a series of experiments in order to study 
how and to what extent other people influenced our opinions and atti-
tudes. The experiments were very simple, the outcomes were intriguing. 
Asch assembled groups of seven to nine young men in a classroom for an 
alleged psychological experiment in visual perception. In the first 
experiment all but one individual in the group had been instructed to act 
in a certain way beforehand, while a lonely individual did not know that 
he sat among a band of conspirators. 
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 An experimenter informs the groups that the task will be to compare 
the length of a black line, a standard, to the length of lines on a separate 
card. One card shows a single vertical black line, this is the standard, 
while the other card shows three vertical black lines. One of these has the 
same length as the standard, the others have varying lengths, the differ-
ence ranging from three quarters of an inch to one inch and three quarters.  
The subjects are now supposed to make a visual comparison of pairs 
of cards, one showing the standard line. The subjects are to tell which of 
the three lines on the second card has the same length as the standard on 
the card showing the standard, and announce their answers in the order 
they are seated.  
It is assumed that the differences in length make it easy to judge which 
of the lines matches the standard. 
In a series of trials subjects are shown such pairs of cards and 
announce their answers. During these trials the subjects having received 
instructions from the experimenter are unanimously to choose the wrong 
lines in certain trials. The focus of the test is on the answers given and the 
behaviour shown by the single unsuspecting subject, in these situations. 
In one experiment he dissents, in the following trials where the major-
ity chooses the wrong line, he becomes more worried and hesitant before 
giving his (correct) answer.  
“The single individual who is not a party to this prearrangement is the 
focal subject of our experiment. He is placed in a position in which, while 
he is actually giving the correct answers, he finds himself unexpectedly in 
a minority of one, opposed by a unanimous and arbitrary majority with 
respect to a clear and simple fact. Upon him we have brought to bear two 
opposed forces: the evidence of his senses and the unanimous opinion of 
a group of his peers. Also, he must declare his judgments in public, 
before a majority which has also stated its position publicly.”
121 
 The subject in question in essence had to choose either to state what 
he believed was the correct answer disagreeing with the majority or go 
along with majority ignoring in fact what his senses told him. 
 In 36,8 per cent of the trials the subject chooses to bow to the major-
ity and give the same answer as they did. Asch also found that around a 
quarter of the subjects placed in this dilemma, were completely inde-
pendent and unwavering giving correct answers and dissenting from the 
majority. Those who yield to the majority apparently did so for a variety 
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of reasons. “ I am wrong, they are right”, or so as “not to spoil the 
experiment”. Many thus went along with majority even believing that the 
majority was wrong. 
 Even though the results of the experiment may sound curious to most 
people, I believe that all have witnessed situations in which something 
like this happened in a group of people. Seeing for instance people with 
an opinion on a certain subject suddenly change their opinion, having 
heard that the majority thinks otherwise. They may of course have 
become convinced that they are wrong, but they may also have changed 
their opinion for some other reason. Not wanting to contradict the major-
ity, not wishing to stick out, afraid of being shut out.  
 In sequential decision-making we might see that people are following 
the examples set by the people who made their decisions first. Like our 
umbrella reference where we open our umbrella because we can see that 
the others already have opened theirs.  
Think of a situation in which you have to buy a new flatscreen TV, 
and good friends have already bought a certain brand that they swear is 
the best. When you visit a store it will demand some persuading by the 
sales people to convince you that you should in fact choose another 
brand. Even in the face of believable evidence you may stick to the 
choice already made by people you trust. 
On a more serious note. When interviewing applicants for an open 
position in your company, you may find one of the applicants to be well 
suited for the job in question, still you may decide not to hire that person, 
because it turns out that this person has already interviewed with other 
companies, and evidently without success. You may then choose to disre-
gard the impression you have got, and copy the decisions made by others 
who may be even unknown to you. 
In a more stringent version of this we talk about information cascades. 
“An “information cascade” occurs when initial decisions coincide in a 
way that it is optimal for each of the subsequent individuals to ignore his 
or her private signals and follow the established pattern.”
122  
Information cascades indicate that we are talking about sequential 
decision making, and about information. 
 Anderson and Holt describe a small experiment used to test for 
information cascades. There were two urns, A and B for the experiment. 
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Urn A contained two light coloured balls and one dark coloured ball, 
while B contained one light-coloured and two dark coloured. Light-col-
oured balls we denote with an l and dark-coloured with a d.
123  
For each round a throw of a dice decided which urn A or B was used. 
The test subjects of course did not know which urn was used, only what 
the urns would contain, and that they would have to make decisions as to 
what urn was used, based upon the drawing of one ball from the urn in 
question.  
 In each session they would sample the urn sequentially by drawing 
one ball from the urn. The ball would be replaced. Each subject would 
write down his or her draw as private information not to be shared with 
the others. Publicly the subject would only announce what decision he or 
she had made as to what urn was used, announcing either A or B. 
 In this way sequence of decisions would be made. This is the results 
of two different sessions
124: 
 
Urn  B  used 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Private  info l  d d d l  l 
Announcement  A B B B B B 
 
 
Urn  B  used 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Private  info l  l  d d d d 
Announcement  A A A A A A 
 
In the first session using urn B, the first individual draws a light ball, 
and announces that this must be urn A. The next subject draws a dark ball 
and announces that it must be from urn B. These announcements cancel 
each other out. The third and fourth subject draw dark balls and announce 
B. They create the “imbalance that can dominate the information con-
tained in a single draw.” This is what happens when Subject 5 and 6 draw 
light balls. They choose to ignore their private information and make 
same choice as their predecessors. Thus the imbalance resulted, in a cas-
cade, and in this case the correct overall decision: Urn B.  
In the another session the decisions made by the first two subjects 
dominate the private information that the following individuals obtain in 
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their draws. Thus subject 3, 4, 5 and 6 announce urn A, ignoring their 
private information. Thus we have cascade again, this time resulting in 
the wrong overall decision. 
Imagine that the subjects had not known the decisions made by their 
predecessors. Then each subject would have had to base his or hers deci-
sion only on the information they obtained from their own draw. This 
would have led to the correct overall decision.  
In real life cascading decisions or actions may be based upon very lit-
tle information. “Cascades are often involved in the formation of a crowd 
or a queue. In communist Eastern Europe, it is said, long shopping lines 
would suddenly precipitate whenever a few people happened to stand 
together.”
125  
In fact Hirschleifer asserts: “An action is fixed upon when the weight 
of evidence grows to be just enough to overcome one person’s opposing 
information. At that point, if the next individual is similar, he is also just 
barely willing to ignore his own information signal, i.e., he is in a cas-
cade. The reasoning extends indefinitely, so that all further individuals do 
the same thing. Thus, a very small preponderance of evidence causes a 
landslide majority to take one action over the other. In this situation, a 
very small shock to the system – such as new public information – can 
affect the behavior of many people.”
126  
One might in fact compare what happens here with some of the theo-
ries found in complexity theory, where small differences in initial condi-
tions lead to very different results. Perhaps this may be illustrated in the 
following way. Think of a land area with mountain ranges and valleys 
with rivers flowing in them. The tributaries of these rivers reach high up 
on the mountain ranges to the water divide. A raindrop falling to one side 
of this divide may end up very far away from a water drop falling on the 
other side of this divide. In the Alps for instance in the Mediterranean 
instead of the North Atlantic.  
 The more or less artificial experiments and examples provided here 
might help understand why individuals may end up acting like a herd and 
it may also point us to some of the serious problems related to herd-like 
behaviour. 
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 In Asch’s experiment one could see that even evidently false infor-
mation leads a significant percentage of individuals to ignore their own 
information, acquiescing instead in the false statements. In the cascade 
experiments we could see how sequential decision-making meant that 
individuals ignored their own information and decided on the basis of 
information about their predecessors’ decisions. In the experiment this 
might result in both correct decisions and incorrect decisions. While the 
Asch’s experiment may show how majority consensus is created, the cas-
cades experiments may show how rapidly cascading opinions can spread 
in a society, and just how little small deviations in initial conditions might 
give rise to very different cascades. 
A somewhat different cause of conformity may have something to do 
with reputation. Our opinions and decisions may be influenced by repu-
tation. By people with a high reputation, or by our attempt to gain or keep 
reputation ourselves. 
In a series of very simple experiments involving quotes from novels in 
the 1930’s Sherif showed that “prestige-suggestion or stereotype plays a 
considerable part in people's judgments. In other words the attitudes 
towards authors serve as reference points. Authors rated high tend to pull 
up, and conversely authors rated low tend to pull down, the rating of the 
passages attributed to them. This is but a specific case of a general psy-
chological principle. It appears that our judgments like our perceptions, 
are organized in relation to definite reference points or in relation to a 
general level of reference.”
127  
Relevant real world examples today are seen in the clustering of inter-
est and opinions around experts, designated as gurus. Perhaps peacocks 
would be a more appropriate name. It would seem that many individuals 
like for instance journalists lose the ability to use their own knowledge 
and common sense when referring to statements from such peacocks. 
They may state very banal or evidently self-contradictory things and still 
people may gather around them as if they have the qualities of the Oracle 
of Delphi, who was also sometimes saying strange things. And the cas-
cade usually widens until in certain areas of expertise very few people 
influence what the “right” opinion is.  
 Perhaps we may conclude this section with the somewhat outrageous 
idea that in many cases we confirm ourselves in our choices in a kind of 
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spiralling cascade of our own choices. Sounds weird? Well think of the 
woozle hunt in Winnie-the-Pooh
128. In this hunt Winnie, the very stupid 
little bear, hits upon a set of track marks. Convinced that they are made 
by the woozle, he sets off. Suddenly he stops and Piglet who has joined 
him asks him: "What's the matter?". Winnie-the-Pooh has suddenly dis-
covered that there are two sets of tracks in front of him. Thus concluding 
that he is following two woozles. Winnie-the-Pooh and Piglet now pro-
ceed in company, until Winnie suddenly stops again pointing to the 
tracks: "The tracks!" said Pooh. "A third animal has joined the other 
two!" "Pooh!" cried Piglet "Do you think it is another woozle?" Seeing 
that the new pair of paw marks are smaller Winnie thinks it might be a 
wizzle. 
 Of course Winnie-the-Pooh was running in circle or more precisely a 
spiral following his own paw marks and when Piglet joins him the foot-
marks of Piglet are added. Thus the woozles are imagined, but, in 
Winnies view the tracks confirm that there are more and more woozles 
and perhaps a single wizzle.
129 
 Now I wonder whether we can see a kind of cascade originating in a 
similar way with our own choices, in the sense that having made a set of 
choices these choices may somewhat like the tracks that Winnie saw con-
vince that we are really doing the right thing. Of course this might be 
multiplied by all the tracks already made by others, but then I suppose we 
are back in the ordinary information cascade. 
Thinking alike 
Here the important idea is that everyone may unknowingly be subject to a 
kind of Lamarckian process in which our beliefs and views of the world 
are shaped by shared, but submerged ideologies that have left traces in all 
our activities. Somewhat in the way we may have been socialised into a 
certain environment. This environment may include values and ideas, 
institutions, and even the language we are using. 
Perhaps this might be exemplified by people always carrying an 
umbrella, although it is not raining very often, but they have always been 
used to carry an umbrella, just in case. 
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While the theories we have seen in the previous section might help 
understand why we act alike, they are not enough. Our thinking and 
acting alike may be due to some shared but submerged ideologies that 
have left traces in all our activities.  
“When people act on the basis of ideology, they inadvertently arrange 
the very conditions that bring reality into correspondence with the ideol-
ogy.”
130 Perhaps many of the assertions modern economics have are in 
the process of becoming what Merton once called self-fulfilling prophe-
cies. A self-fulfilling prophecy in which “ a false definition of a situation 
[is] evoking a behavior which makes the originally false conception come 
true.”
131  
We do not need to be forced into a common mould, we may actually 
believe that this is the only way to think. The comprehensive example of 
this might be the ideas and values set by individualism itself. Believing in 
the kind of individualism we have described in the previous sections 
gives us a shared view of the world that of course influences the way we 
think and the way we behave. As we have seen, our actions based upon 
these beliefs have undergone serious alterations in comparison with the 
original ideas about the individualism turning us perhaps into caricatures 
and stereotypes.  
 “Theories can become self-fulfilling when institutional designs and 
organizational arrangements— structures, reward systems, measurement 
practices, selection processes—reflect the explicit or implicit theories of 
their designers, in the process that transforms “image into reality”.”
132  
This is a topic that we have treated in a paper discussing the way 
modern economics pervade all areas of our lives. In this paper we saw 
how basic economic assumptions about human nature may in fact help 
make these assumptions come true.  
Rattner and Miller found that the norm of self-interest had effects on 
social action. People would believe that if they did not show self-interest 
in their actions they would somehow be seen as strange and irrational. 
They concluded that “lacking a self-interested account, people may feel 
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they lack both the moral authorization and the psychological cover to 
act.”
133  
We concluded that incentives shaped by such ideas led us to focus 
heavily on extrinsic rewards and sanctions to bring forth the desired 
behaviour. What we do not realise is that these external efforts to moti-
vate us to certain activities quietly erode away the motivation that we 
would otherwise have got from the activity itself.  
 I fear that we are in fact in the act of creating a vicious downward 
pointing spiral, in which our views of man more or less force man to act 
in a way that supports this belief. Studies of behaviour in praxis may thus 
show that the assumptions were correct, leading presumably to a 
strengthening of the already problematic influence of these assumptions 
on practice. For instance by relying even more on extrinsic motivation, 
performance based pay schemes, rules and regulations.  
 Such assumptions and models may inscribe themselves in most of our 
activities without anyone of us realising that. They may serve as a hidden 
instrument of socialisation, a subtle working but very efficient rectifier or 
“gleichschaltung” of individual minds leading them to think and act alike. 
Not only making us believe in these ideas without realising it, but also 
making it difficult to move outside the mould economic assumptions and 
models have put us in. Should anyone attempt to do just that, anonymous 
mechanisms would soon set that individual right. 
Ferraro et al.
134 also see ideas like these becoming self-fulfilling theo-
ries “because they provide a language for comprehending the world. Lan-
guage affects what people see, how they see it, and the social categories 
and descriptors they use to interpret their reality. It shapes what people 
notice and ignore, what they believe is important and what is not.  
This is exactly what Newspeak was used for in Orwell’s “1984,” a 
kind of “reality control” meaning that language should take over control 
of the individual mind, prohibiting dangerous thoughts from entering the 
brain. 
“To do anything that suggested a taste for solitude, even to go for a 
walk by yourself, was always slightly dangerous. There was a word for it 
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in Newspeak: ownlife, it was called, meaning individualism and eccen-
tricity.”
135  
Modern Newspeak may serve the same purpose, helping prevent 
strange and perhaps slightly disturbing individual ideas. 
In a strange way individualism may also lead us to become more alike. 
Each and everyone of us may strive to become something special, special 
looks, special consumption, special ideas and habits. The problem is that 
we are often copying the same ideals, having the same cosmetic surgery, 
the same whitening of the teeth, drinking the same wine recommended by 
wine experts, reading the bestsellers, and generally behaving like surfers 
on beach riding the same waves or vogues until they die out, leaving us 
searching for new waves. 
 Perhaps this is not so curious as it may seem. When we strive to pre-
sent ourselves as something special, using for instance, as we have previ-
ously seen, consumption to show this, we are constrained in our choices. 
If we want others to see us as something special we have to choose, in the 
case of consumption, something that we are convinced that others will see 
as something special. For this to work we have to choose something that 
is in general valued by others. Thus in order to be recognised and appre-
ciated by others we must of necessity have a shared conception of what is 
worth striving for, what is connected to status, to individuality.  
Middle aged well off males in Western societies buy Harley Davidson 
motorcycles with all the paraphernalia belonging to this, like those stupid 
looking small round shell helmets, and all the rest including perhaps a 
Polo shirt or HD pen to be used while not on the bike
136. All just to make 
people aware that somewhere inside that stupid helmet is a small Hells 
Angel with a devil may care attitude, independent with a spirit of free-
dom, youthfulness, and an out of bounds wildness,  
This only works as long as the right people can read the symbols, and 
as long as there are values attached to them. If nobody knows what a 
Harley Davidson is, and has no idea of what a Hells Angel might be, it 
may not be very smart to use a symbol like a Harley Davidson motorcy-
cle to impress others.  
 “Consumers (not necessarily all, but at least those in the reference 
group of interest) must have in common a shared conception of the prod-
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uct’s symbolic meaning. For example, driving a ‘prestige’ automobile 
will not serve as an effective symbol of one’s social status unless others 
in the relevant social groups share the driver’s belief that the automobile 
is, indeed, prestigious.”
137  
The result being of course that in order to become something as an in-
dividual in society where appearances become more and more important, 
one has to choose the same things that others like oneself would also 
choose. And suddenly we see a synchronisation in what these so-called 
independent individuals are doing.  
We find the same phenomenon in the scientific endeavours, meaning 
that what is seen as scientific may at least in the social sciences and in the 
humanities be similar to the Harley Davidson example seen above. With a 
researcher trying to become a researcher by acting like one, choosing 
whatever theories seen as being in vogue at the time, like social construc-
tivism, and seeing everything through the shapely glasses of social con-
structivism. And being recognised by those who at the moment value 
such an approach. He may not really be contributing anything original 
and may use only the most schematic version of popular theories, but that 
may be enough to pass off as researcher. 
The wonders of globalisation and internationalisation will mean that 
we will see a higher and higher degree of synchronisation in what we are 
seeing as valuable, worthwhile, popular, the right way including what we 
see as individualistic and original. Thereby in fact defeating most 
endeavours to be something, to an individual, to think an original 
thought, and to act independently.  
If we think back for a moment to the gradient search example a few 
pages back this would in effect mean that we would try to find the highest 
mountain in the same place. In this way we actually limit the search 
space. What people read, watch in their TV’s, read in their newspaper 
seem to undergo the same expanding synchronisation. A good example of 
this synchronisation can perhaps be seen in the vague concept of global-
isation itself or in popular management ideas related to this globalisation. 
There is no end to the fads that seem to roll in synchronised waves 
over modern societies, letting managers focus on: Shareholder value, lean 
management, lean sizing, TQM (Total Quality Management), bench-
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marking, knowledge management, human resources managing. Managers 
seem united in a view characterised by these and other terms signifying 
that they are using the most advanced tools and appear to be in control, 
and show accountability. Glaser talks of management “duckspeak” using 
an expression from Orwell. Having criticized the uncritical use of such 
terms he finishes the article with these duckspeak terms: “360 degree 
feedback – people talking to each other; empowerment – asking people to 
do things; the learning organization – claptrap.”
138 
Reacting alike to shared problems and challenges 
Here the important idea is that when people experience the same problem 
or challenge they may react independently, but all do the same. In this 
case conformity does not indicate that individuals have given up inde-
pendent thoughts and opinions.  
This goes for instance for sudden changes in shared environmental 
conditions, with people all over the world subject to similar problems and 
solution spaces. For instance reacting to threats like the avarian flu by 
staying away from dishes made from chickens. 
Or each individual may discover an advantage in doing the same as 
the others, for instance moving in a “stream” together with others in 
crowded pedestrian areas.  
An umbrella example: If it suddenly rains umbrellas may seem a good 
solution to everyone, even with no inspiration from others. 
In this explanation of synchronous and apparently conform behaviour 
we expect sensible people who are subjected to similar problems and 
challenges may for a variety of reasons react in the same way, creating 
the impression similar to the impression we get from the acting alike and 
thinking alike explanations. The difference being that in this case people 
are really acting independently and on their own volition. Not unthink-
ingly, not just following in the tracks of others, not ignoring their own 
information and knowledge. 
 Still the result might not be too different from the explanations dis-
cussed above. A simple case may show why. In 1998, transport workers 
in Denmark went on a strike which was joined by other unions. Quickly it 
became clear to everyone that it might soon be a problem to get petrol for 
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one’s car. A common reaction to this was to fill up the car and even extra 
containers. All very sensible seen from each individual’s view.  
In the news it was mentioned in passing that supermarkets would soon 
run out of bread and yeast. The result was a kind of stampede to get the 
small packets of yeast that one could use to make one’s own bread. Even 
people who would not usually bake their own bread went to get as much 
yeast as they could lay their hands on. And the result was that yeast dis-
appeared from the shelves. Normally there would have been yeast enough 
for normal consumption, but now it suddenly disappeared, together with 
petrol of course. Not very smart in the view of most people, and not nec-
essary, but what could people have done otherwise. 
 Apparently something similar happened when it was announced that 
the avarian flue might show up in Europe in the winter of 2005/06. Many 
people went to buy stocks of the medicine Tamilflu, which was regarded 
as the only potential remedy that might help if a person somehow caught 
the flue, even though expertise saw an epidemic as being very unlikely. 
Of course people also did something else, they turned away from chick-
ens, and bought less fowl, creating a small stampede away from some-
thing, in this case chicken. From a health viewpoint perhaps not very 
smart, but still many reacted individually in this way. 
 There is nothing new or mysterious in what we see here. This form of 
stampede also ooccurs when people strive to get from cities to beaches 
and clog all access roads on a hot summer day. When teenagers attempt 
to get to the open air concerts of world famous popstars. Or when news 
media announce an especially promising IPO (Initial Public Offer) of a 
company going public, and every potential shareowner wants to get his or 
her hand on some of these shares. Or in countless other cases.  
 I believe though that these cases are different from the one’s we have 
been discussing in the previous sections. Although they contain elements 
of the explanations found in “acting alike” and “ thinking alike”. For 
example in the propensity to act on the similar impulses. Here the indi-
viduals act more or less independently, it is just that their individual 
efforts combine to give what is sometimes stupid or unpleasant results. 
One might perhaps say that each individual is in fact following Smith’s 
dictum: “[G)enerally, indeed, neither intends to promote the publick 
interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. …by directing [his] 
industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he 77 
intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by 
an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.”  
It is just that the end promoted is somewhat of a problem for each and 
everyone in these cases. 
 Globalisation and internationalisation not the least in field of media, 
may make these stampede results more frequent, and I wonder what one 
can do to de-synchronise as it were the actions of an ever-growing num-
ber of people prepared to act on the same impulses. 
Forced conformity  
Here the important idea is that individuals may have limited choices in 
the way they express their individuality. If we are forced to choose like 
everybody else, or if the variety of choices is limited, we will of course 
look alike. Or as Hirschleifer and Teah mention using e-mail when eve-
rybody else is using e-mail we may sooner or later feel that we have no 
choice but to use e-mail ourselves.  
In umbrella terms it may mean that there are only black umbrellas 
available and no raincoats for instance, meaning that we will see every-
one with a black umbrella when it is raining. 
Suppose that social science for some reason is moving in a direction in 
which the quality of research and of the individual carrying out the 
research is judged by the number of journal articles published, multiplied 
by an index signifying the quality of the journal in which these articles 
are published. Then scientific reputation is of course dependent on the 
number of articles published in these journals. A young post doc wanting 
to make a career in social science would be expected to conform to this 
system for earning a reputation. Evidently this means that there will be a 
competitive pressure to publish or perish. What this means for originality 
and engagement into research areas where results are a long time in 
coming or where it is difficult to see whether anything will emerge from 
one’s efforts, one can only guess.  
 One thing is fairly certain though. “The likely result should be clear. 
If rewards come to those who conform, cascade-like behavior will 
increase, simply because the incentive to be correct is strengthened or 
replaced by the incentive to do what others do. The extent of this effect 
will depend on the extent of the incentive to conform. But whenever the 78 
incentive is positive, people will be all the more likely to ignore their pri-
vate information and to follow others.”
139 
Sunstein sees a similar problem for reputational cascades: “Exactly the 
same problem arises in a reputational cascade, where the public, for a 
very different reason, is unable to learn what many people know and 
think. Here people silence themselves not because they believe that they 
are wrong but because they do not want to face the disapproval that, they 




141 calls this silence “Schweigespirale” or spirals of 
silence. This is appropriate as the silence is propagated like cascades.  
“Aus Angst isoliert zu werden, unterlassen es Anhänger der eigentli-
chen Mehrheitsmeinung, ihre Meinung öffentlich zu äußern. Dies führt 
Noelle-Neumann auf die soziale Natur des Menschen zurück, die ihn 
Isolation fürchten lässt und jeden einzelnen einem Konformitätsdruck 
unterwirft. Aus diesem Grund ist jeder Mensch ständig damit beschäftigt, 
seine Umwelt zu beobachten ("Prozess der quasi-statistischen Wahrneh-
mung der öffentlichen Meinung"). Dadurch erfährt er, welche Meinungen 
und Einstellungen öffentlich geäußert werden können, ohne Sanktionen 
befürchten zu müssen”.
142  
Economic logic may be even more forceful in their ability to bring 
about conformity. Baumol and Blackman
143 have shown that it is not 
possible to introduce extraregarding views, moral and ethical considera-
tions into the economic logic. A perfect market may lead to allocative 
efficiency, but it is difficult to see how it could lead to virtuous behav-
iour. According to this view a single manager of a company can do noth-
ing, whatever his own attitude and values. If a company tries to raise the 
standards on its own, it will soon find itself at a severe competitive disad-
vantage. According to Baumol and Blackman “[the company’s] good 
behavior will terminate rapidly, either because it is abandoned by man-
agement as a matter of self-preservation, or, if management holds out 
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because of its moral convictions, because the ethical firm is driven out of 
the market altogether, succumbing to the competitive prowess of its less 
fastidious rivals.”
144  
The voluntary pursuit of socially acceptable goals in general are 
doomed to fail: “To put the matter bluntly, the market automatically 
interprets any expenditure by the firm that is undertaken only as a matter 
of good works as an act of unmitigated wastefulness.”
145 In a competitive 
market building upon a Smithian self-interest there is no room for this 
kind of expenditure. Whatever the attitude of the owners, managers and 
employees, they would be forced to behave like all of their competitors. 
Dissentients have something worth hearing  
Just following in the tracks made by others ignoring one’s own informa-
tion and knowledge, or keeping quiet and acquiescing in the decisions 
made by others in order to further one’s own immediate self interest is a 
problem for all of society. Just as in the information cascade examples 
wrong decisions may be the result, and new ideas and actions that may 
represent potential benefits or smarter solutions to current problems may 
not be expressed, resulting in a loss for society.  
 No wonder that Sunstein concludes: “social influences also diminish 
the total level of information within any group, and they threaten, much 
of the time, to lead individuals and institutions in the wrong directions. 
Dissent can be an important corrective; many groups and institutions have 
too little of it.
 
As we shall see, conformists are free-riders, whereas dis-
senters often confer benefits on others; and it is tempting to free-ride.”
146 
In the real world this would mean that we should encourage individu-
als to gain use and reveal the “private” information in their decisions and 
actions. Relying not only on the information they can get from the 
behaviour of others.  
This would make it possible to break cascades. In an experiment 
similar to the one we have just seen, Willinger and Ziegelmeyer,
147 try to 
show what happens when some individuals gain more information. In this 
experiment the subjects had a special option when the two previous play-
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ers in the sequence had announced the same decision. They were then 
allowed two draws instead of just one before they made their decision. 
Thus they had the possibility of gaining more information about the con-
tent of the urn. The remaining subjects were then informed that this deci-
sion was based upon two draws. Willinger and Ziegelmeyer report that 
these better “informed” subjects were indeed able to break cascades. Not 
always though. From this experiment one might draw the provisional 
conclusion that better informed people, who are seen as better informed 
by those who follow, might at least influence the decision making of 
those who follow. This is certainly not sensational news, but it seems to 
fit reality. 
More interesting is an experiment that shows what happens when the 
subjects were rewarded for correct group decision and punished for a 
wrong group decision. Group decision being in this case equal to the 
decisions a majority of subjects had decided individually. This apparently 
brought forth more decisions based upon the private draws, instead of the 
subject relying on the previous decisions. In most of the cases the indi-
vidual decisions matched the private information gained from the draw. 
Thus cascades were broken, and more correct group decisions made. This 
is easy to understand, when looking at the table. The individual draws are 
the same as in the second example above, but this time the individual 
decisions are based upon the individual draws, resulting presumably in 
the decisions seen in the announcement row. The majority decision is of 
course B, which is correct. 
 
Urn  B  used 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Private  info l  l  d d d d 
Announcement  A A B B B B 
 
“The majority-rewarding variation on the urn experiment gives people 
an incentive to disclose accurate, privately-held information. This is the 
information from which the group benefits, and this is the information 
that does not emerge if people are rewarded for correct individual deci-
sions. Full disclosure of accurate information is a central goal of institu-
tional design.”
148 We have to be cautious here though.  
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Group decision making based upon individual and independent deci-
sions may be important in problem solving. Another simple example 
referred to by Surowieck in his “The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many 
Are Smarter Than the Few and How Collective Wisdom Shapes Busi-
ness”
149 might show why.  
 The experiment involves a glass filled with jelly beans, or think of 
peas or marbles. A series of individuals make independent guesses as to 
the number of beans in the glass. It turned out that the group estimate, or 
the average of the guesses made, was a better estimate than all but one of 
the individual guesses. This led Surowieck to the conclusion that in gen-
eral group decisions based upon independent individual decisions 
trumped individual decisions.
150  
This might be right in the experiment and in many cases in the real 
word, but if we look at phenomena like innovation or changes in groups 
and societies, the majority decisions or group averages might not repre-
sent a very efficient method.  
Instead it is independent individual decision making that may be 
important for new approaches in research, new insights into society, new 
technologies, new products and ways of living. 
We see how it is actually in the interest of society to encourage inde-
pendence of opinion, and may we add, of research, in order not to end up 
in very local minima. This calls for an explanation.  
Think again of our mountainous landscape, and the task of finding the 
highest mountain in this landscape through gradient search. We might 
start out from the same valley and move up the steepest gradient we can 
find, until we reach a point from where we can only go downwards. That 
we may not have found the highest mountain by this method is evident. 
Somehow we ought to have had many different starting points in order 
for us to be reasonably sure that one of us would in fact find the highest 
mountain by this method.  
Sunstein recounts Sen when he states that democracies have real mate-
rial advantages: “Consider the fact that in the history of the world, no 
society with democratic elections and free speech has ever experienced a 
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famine—a demonstration of the extent in which political liberty protects 
people who do not exercise it.”
151 Somewhat paradoxically, it is the abil-
ity for each individual to take an individual stand, using the “private” 
information it possesses, that makes organisational and societal progress 
possible. 
 This was already clear to Mill, when he wrote: “When there are per-
sons to be found, who form an exception to the apparent unanimity of the 
world on any subject, even if the world is in the right, it is always prob-
able that dissentients have something worth hearing to say for them-
selves, and that truth would lose something by their silence.”
152  
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